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From a Panacea to a Panopticon: The Use and
Misuse of Technology in the Regulation of Judges
AMNON REICHMAN, YAIR SAGY, & SHLOMI BALABAN†
This Article reveals the untold story of Legal-Net, Israel’s cloud-based judicial management
system. While scholarly attention has thus far focused on the narrow question of the impact
technology may have on judicial decision-making or on efficiency, little has been written on the
manner in which technology affects the regulation and management of judges and the
administration of justice as a whole. Through a combined historical analysis and interview
methodology, we trace the development of Legal-Net from the early 1990s and situate it within a
theoretical law-and-technology context. Detailing Legal-Net’s trajectory provides meaningful
insights as to the relationship between regulation, technology, and the judicial role. More
specifically, it unearths four approaches to technology as a regulatory tool, harnessed by the
state to govern the public sector itself (and in particular, the production of justice): the
bureaucratic/administrative approach, the structural approach, the managerial/integrative
approach, and the normative approach. While distinct, these approaches interlace and
demonstrate that the processes through which organizational technology is developed and
implemented are far from value-neutral. The emerging technological ecosystem and in
particular the “technological gaze”—the omnipresent data collection via managerial
technology—have considerable implications on the manner in which judges are nudged to
comply with expectations. The research further reveals that, as a new technological ecosystem
was established, so was the internal perspective of judges regarding the judicial function
transformed: from “retail” justice to “wholesale” provision of dispute resolution services
(under the law).
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INTRODUCTION
Today, when a judge in Israel hears a case, virtually all her actions are
channeled through Legal-Net: a digital, online, and all-encompassing platform.
With the noticeable exception of the Supreme Court,1 Legal-Net pervades the
totality of the Israeli judicial system. It is the central venue through which
litigants, attorneys, court secretariats, judges, and court administrators interact
in each phase of the judicial process. While performing some productivity
functions, Legal-Net is, at its core, a management system that monitors the
entire span of the production of justice. It nudges, sometimes prods, and
overall regulates the various officials (primarily judges), which generates vast
amounts of data and analytics at all levels. This data may span from the
performance of the individual judge, through specific courts (or departments
therein), to the judiciary as a whole.
How was this system developed? What does the development process, led
by the state, teach us about the relationship between law and technology more
generally? And what impact, if any, did the development and implementation
of Legal-Net have on judging? These questions are at the core of this Article.
While considerable attention has been paid to the development of marketbased platforms,2 less is known on the development of bureaucratic platforms,
namely platforms used by the government to manage its own processes.
Similarly, while attention has been directed to the possible effect of data
analytics and AI on judicial decision-making,3 much less is known about how
certain court administrations use technology to manage the judicial process.4

1. As elaborated below, Legal-Net “manages” the Magistrate Court (sometimes referred to as “Courts
of the Peace”) and District Courts in Israel—the two judicial instances that deal with the vast majority of court
cases in Israel—civil, administrative, and criminal. However, Legal-Net was not implemented in Israel’s thirdtier, highest court, the Supreme Court, nor does it reach the religious courts and the quasi-judicial institutions
in charge of the execution of judgments. For a description of the system, see infra note 26 and accompanying
text. For a description of the system managing cases at the Supreme Court level, see infra notes 59–64 and
accompanying text.
2. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017).
3. Daniel Ben-Ari, et al., Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law: An Analysis and Proof of
Concept Experiment, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 35 (2017) (“[W]e can predict that in the long run, AI
technologies using machine learning and deep learning techniques may replace lawyers, arbitrators, mediators,
and even judges.”).
4. By managing the judicial process, or “judicial management,” we mean the practices and tools
available to administrators (who may, or may not, be judges), in charge of devising, implementing, and
enforcing policies and decisions regarding the way the judiciary, a court, segment of a court or individual
judges carry out their tasks, including the definition of these tasks, their allocation, and the assessment of the
manner in which they were completed. This function is different from the classical judicial function of
addressing cases, including judicial disposition thereof, on the merits. The term also refers to the management
by a judge of his or her tasks (such as the tools and practices available to him or her), as well as to policies and
decisions regarding the environment within which judges operate, their work conditions, facilities, benefits
(excluding salary, which is set by constitutional and statutory norms), and auxiliary personnel. For more on
judicial management and judicial administration, see THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE FOR JUDICIAL SYSTEMS:
DEVELOPING A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE (Marco Fabri & Philip M. Langbroek eds., 2000);
Michal Agmon-Gonen, Judicial Independence: The Threat from Within?, 18 HAMISHPAT 2, 11–12 (2004)

592

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:589

This is important to the extent the technology impacts judicial practices, and
potentially even the judicial role, and thus carries normative implications.5
Legal-Net itself, one of the first systems designed to govern all aspects of
litigation, has attracted little scholarly attention thus far.6 The previouslyuntold story surrounding the development and implementation of Legal-Net is
particularly important in this context. It provides rare insights into the role of
governments in developing managerial technologies and the transformation
that technology-driven ecosystems may bring about within governmental
organizations, including the judiciary. In this respect, this Article will show
that Legal-Net ushered in a new era of judicial management (in terms of
efficiency and modes of control), thereby raising separation of powers
concerns. Additionally, it has conceivably transformed what judging is, at least
as perceived from within the system. Whereas before judges viewed their task
as primarily requiring the individualized application of a unique type of
judicial wisdom (or art) honed over a lengthy legal career, Legal-Net is
premised on a bureaucratic logic, which shapes the self-conception of judges
as having a standardized role of processing disputes with an emphasis on
keeping the production line running as smoothly as possible and thus requires a
different set of skills and sensibilities.
In analyzing the development, ascendance, and expansion of Legal-Net,
we advance three main arguments. The first argument addresses the
development process. Legal-Net in its current form cannot be understood if the
rise and ultimate fall of the “grand-design” approach is ignored. This approach
sought to harness technology to structure the entire domain of litigation,
including fully digitizing courtrooms by establishing a paper-less court, nearly
automated case-management tools, and an all-encompassing inventory
analytics. The “grand design” attempt came to a screeching halt because it
required too grand a technological leap at the time, even for the innovative

(Heb.); J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe with Only Chiefs,
1978 BYU L. REV. 39.
5. See Charles W. Nihan & Russell R. Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration of
Justice in the Federal Courts, 1981 BYU. L. REV. 659, 660 (“[T]echnological innovation will affect the
judicial process.”); see also Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of
Citation Practices in the Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 51, 60 (citing U.S.
Federal Judicial Center Inquiry that found many federal judges embraced early computerized research
programs, and also noting that one judge believed computers would “save precious professional time in the
routine low-order search which finally uncovers the few pieces calling for close study and lawyer-like
judgment.”); Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 87 (2016)
(“[T]he Ninth Circuit seems to be more receptive toward implementing changes, particularly responses that
appear to be relatively ‘neutral’—such as more judicial specialization, greater reliance on visiting judges and a
more pervasive use of technology.”). As our research reveals, the Israeli judiciary, albeit consisting of some
judicial entrepreneurs and embedded in the mentality of the Start-Up Nation, were less enthusiastic in adopting
an all-encompassing technological platform.
6. For a notable exception, see Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond Efficiency: The Transformation of
Courts Through Technology, 12 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–32 (2008). Rabinovich-Eini refers to Legal-Net as
a “NGCS—New Generation Court System.” Id. at 7.
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Israeli high-tech sector.7 It also evoked resistance from a judiciary, weary of
the hierarchical structuring of their judicial conduct. Yet, in hindsight this
failure is an integral part of Legal-Net’s success. It forced the administration
and its IT department to break down the ingredients that could and should be
digitized and to prioritize development and implementation of the technology.
It also forced the engagement of the judiciary and the administrative
stakeholders in the design process, which helped secure buy-in and also
bridged the legal-technological divide.8 The platform that was developed on
the fragments (and ruins) of the “grand revolution” approach was no less
revolutionary, but was (and still is) a product of a piece-meal process, which
evolved with twists and turns; only the latest of which reinstituted the
comprehensive nature of the system and its overarching control.
The second argument addresses broader law-and-technology themes,
related to the attitude towards technology by policymakers charged with
judicial management. The incremental manner in which Legal-Net took shape
allowed for the interlace of four different policy attitudes. Each attitude
approached the law-and-technology interface differently. The first saw
technology as a necessity. Policymakers turned to technology because there
was simply no other choice, given the rising volume of cases and the mounting
complexity of the judicial system.9 Under this approach, absent technological
innovation, bureaucratic systems—the judiciary included—would run into an
overload and experience a severe system slowdown, if not failure. The second
treated technology as a strong regulatory tool with which agencies govern.
Under this approach, technology is a command-and-control architecture, and
therefore it should be designed—by building technological “do’s” and
“don’ts,” walls and paths—to strictly channel the judicial process. The third
attitude views technology as a regulatory tool, but one operating on a different
plane: it is the heart of an ecosystem for synthesizing the needs and interests of
the diverse stakeholders. According to this approach, IT platforms generate a
sense of, and an actual realization of, “an organization” (or an agency or
community). These platforms are enabling tools that not only improve
communication, order interactions, and set out structure, but also offer a
unifying collaborative-integrative domain that synchronizes and incorporates
the needs of the various stakeholders. Having access to the platform, therefore,
comes with an ecosystem of functions as well as professional identity and
hierarchies, which become central to the operation of government. Under the
7. This point became particularly evident in the interviews we conducted with Yarden Yardeni,
Information Technology and Services Consultant and Contractor—The Administration of Courts. Mr. Yardeni
was a key member of the Legal-Net original design team; as a senior officeholder in the Administration’s IT
department. He also played a significant role in the design of other, related technological endeavors, pursued
by the Administration, such as “the E-filing court,” which will be discussed infra Subpart III.B.
8. See infra Subpart III.C.
9. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 165, 185–86
(2017) (arguing that many judicial technology efforts were “aimed at improving efficiency and dealing with
budgetary constraints, rather than re-imagining the litigation process and the role of courts.”).
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fourth approach, technology is embedded in, and therefore must reflect, a set of
core values. Recognizing that technology is regulative in nature, the questions
developers must, and in our context did, face are: which values to implement,
how to reach an agreement over such values within the governmental agency,
and then how to ensure that the values are appropriately integrated into the
technological design and application. This approach—technology as a site of
values—was of particular salience when the governmental agency facing IT
design questions was an agency whose daily operation revolves around values,
namely the judiciary.10
The third argument, building upon the last point, addresses the impact
Legal-Net had on judging. The management of judges—both system-wide and
on an individual-judge level—raises obvious normative considerations (such as
the tension between accountability and independence),11 which could not be
assessed if the contemporary interface between technology and the judicial
process is not considered. This Article reveals two such normative points.
Firstly, and bluntly put, Legal-Net made judges substantially more transparent
(to their seniors, but also to their peers) than in earlier days. It transformed the
manner in which judges are monitored by presidents of courts, the Chief
Justice, Ministry of Justice officials, and, above all, the Administration of
Court (the “Administration”) and its head, the Director of Courts (the
“Director”)12 who administer the production of justice in Israel.13
Consequently, the manner in which a single judge conducts herself can be
easily measured in comparison to her peers (in the same judicial instance or in
other courts). Likewise, a section within a court, or a court in a certain
location, can be comparatively analyzed in relation to its relevant
counterparts.14 Such transparency may be regarded as laudable, as a
component of ensuring that tenured judges provide quality service.15 But
Legal-Net’s regulative power may certainly carry significant risks regarding
the independence of the single judge (and aggregately, of judges) vis-à-vis her
regulators, and indirectly, vis-à-vis other interested segments in and around the
10. See id. at 204 (recognizing that the introduction of algorithms into the judicial process raises
questions about what judicial values these algorithms support); see also Lavie, supra note 5 (suggesting that,
to the extent the technology is perceived as neutral, it may be more easily embraced). We show that, to the
extent the managerial systems are comprehensive, they are inherently implicated with value judgment
regarding their design and managerial assumptions, approach, and expected impact.
11. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 118 (2009) (addressing the relationship between judicial accountability
and independence, as managed by the institution of judicial councils).
12. For an overview of the institutional matrix governing judicial management in Israel, see Guy Lurie,
Amnon Reichman, & Yair Sagy, Agencification and the Administration of Courts in Israel, 14 REG. &
GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2020).
13. We elaborate further on this argument infra Part V.
14. See Telephone Interview with Yarden Yardeni, Information Technology and Services Consultant and
Contractor, The Administration of Courts (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Yardeni’s First Interview].
15. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the impact that novel technology had on Israeli
courts’ productivity). Measuring the quality of the judicial service is, of course, no easy task. See 69 HOW TO
MEASURE THE QUALITY OF JUDICIAL REASONING 2 (Mátyás Bencze & Gar Yein Ng eds., 2018).
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court system, who may use the transparency to burn rather than cleanse the
process.
Secondly, the introduction of Legal-Net required approaching the judicial
process as something that may be programmed, according to rules of civil and
criminal procedure. Consequently, a particular kind of technology, with its
language, manuals, and assessments protocols, was developed and
implemented. The unintended consequence of this endeavor resulted in judges
conceiving of their role as part of a production line, the function of which is to
provide a certain kind of service, and less to be the traditional masters of
justice in their courts, focused on resolving individual disputes and guiding
behavior according to the laws. This transformation of the self-conception of
judging carries potentially far-reaching implications, which may be deemed as
revolutionary as the digital system that brought this transformation about.
This argument about Legal-Net’s impact on judging points to new areas
of inquiry in the broader research field of judicial behavior and motivation.16
While other scholars have looked into the general question of how institutional
design can affect both individual and system-wide judicial reputation,17 and
some have examined the potential of implementing technological solutions to
guide the process of decision-making,18 the specific question of how
managerial technology affects judicial behavior is under-examined. This
Article provides a possible starting point by laying out the potential connection
between technology—the development process, the implementation process,
and the product/platform itself—and the judicial mindset. The institutional
design and technological ecosystem within which judges perform their role are
important and should be further studied, as they shape the judicial environment

16. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Things Everybody Else
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). Posner’s influential essay “models the judicial utility function in terms
that allows judges to be seen as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives.” Id. at 1.
Research has shown that judges are motivated by a range of factors unrelated to the legal questions at issue.
One of these factors is a desire for leisure time. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark et al., Estimating the Effect of Leisure
on Judicial Performance, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (2018). A second factor revolves around re-election
concerns, where applicable. Alma Cohen, Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, Judicial Decision Making: A
Dynamic Reputation Approach, 44. J. LEGAL STUD. S133 (2015). More broadly, research demonstrates that
judges are prone to the same mental shortcuts as the general population, which often leads to legally irrelevant
factors motivating decisions. For evidence that judges “[overweigh] the salient facts of the case,” see Pedro
Bordalo et al., Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions, 44. J. LEGAL STUD. S7, S18 (2015). For evidence that
sentencing decisions are affected by judges’ exposure (or lack thereof) to more serious crimes, see Adi
Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2017). For evidence that the racial identity of
lower court judges impacts appeal decisions, see Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in U.S.
Courts, 44. J. LEGAL STUD. S187 (2015).
17. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the Judiciary, 4 J.
COMP. L. 228 (2009).
18. Outside the organizations and technology field, other scholars have identified low-technology
mechanisms for improving the judicial decision-making process. See Zhuang Lui, Does Reason Writing
Reduce Decision Bias? Experimental Evidence from Judges in China, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (2018)
(finding that forcing judges to write down their reasoning prior to making their decision served as an effective
“debiasing procedure”).
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and are therefore relevant to understanding the different forms of judicial
accountability.19
The structure of the remainder of this Article will be as follows: we will
first address some methodological concerns, given the novelty of the approach
we undertook. We will then provide a description of Legal-Net, followed by a
detailed account of the four above-mentioned approaches to the interaction
between technology and the management of the production of justice,
embedded in the development of the platform. We will then address the
normative dimension of technology—notably, the transparent, all-observing
features of the system. We will conclude with a tentative epilogue, regarding
the state of Legal-Net today and, in particular, the ongoing struggle
surrounding its implementation, as the system evolves to include data mining
and analytics.
I. PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS
A. CASE STUDY
Building on the taxonomy of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett,20
this Article deploys the “disciplined configurative” approach—an interpretive
method that uses theoretical frameworks to understand a discrete development
in greater detail. More specifically, we deploy a combined historical analysis
and interview methodology in order to unearth the development of Legal-Net.
We then turn to law-and-technology frameworks in order to situate the
development in a theoretical context, thereby shedding light on the meaning of
the development as well as on the frameworks themselves. This
methodological approach is useful—and necessary—when a novel research
question arises and therefore the relevant literature has not yet identified the
applicable variables for covering a larger set of cases. To date, we are not
aware of similar examinations of the development of judicial management
digital platforms.21 Focusing on a single case study thus assures that this novel
endeavor is conducted in a rigorous manner, sensitive to the relevant nuances
and cognizant of the complexities between the various pertinent factors—
complexities which may be lost if the research is expanded (and consequently
simplified) to include other cases. A case study is an invitation not only for a
critical evaluation of the findings with respect to the jurisdiction examined, but
19. For an overview of different mechanisms for judicial accountability, see Niel Chisholm, The Faces of
Judicial Independence: Democratic Versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and
Promotion in South Korea and Taiwan, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 893 (2014).
20. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005).
21. Other authors have surveyed different technological capacities of different judicial systems through
the lens of technological efficiency. See, e.g., Janet Walker & Garry D. Watson, New Trends in Procedural
Law: New Technologies and the Civil Litigation Process, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 253
(2008). Our examination of Legal-Net provides a more critical analysis of how the quest for technological
efficiency implicates other normative concerns with judicial management.

April 2020]

THE USE AND MISUSE OF TECHNOLOGY

597

also for testing the applicability of the methods, the relevance of the findings,
and the purchase of the variables in other jurisdictions. It is our hope that this
study, and the novel application of this combined historical analysis and
interview methodology, will set the grounds for future case studies that will
further realize the full potential for a comparative analysis of the relationship
between technological platforms designed to manage the provision of “judicial
services” and the judicial function itself.
B. WHY LEGAL-NET?
Legal-Net was chosen as the case study for two main reasons. First,
Legal-Net is one of the early, if the not the first, cloud-based comprehensive
court administration platforms developed by a state. Surprisingly, it has not
been fully studied before, despite the apparent importance for understanding
the daily operation of the justice system. Second, the system’s structure (and
modifications throughout the years) raise important questions regarding the
relationship between law and technology in the context of managing judges,
and regulation more generally. This case study therefore offers fertile grounds
for examining the theoretical frameworks within which managerial technology
is developed and understood.
C. STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH
Methodologically, the Article is based on the analysis of documents
related to Legal-Net’s development process, as well as a series of interviews
with the men and women who have been—and some of whom still are—
involved in the development of Legal-Net. The comprehensive interviews
encompassed both managerial officials of various levels as well as members of
the courts’ technological corpus. Specifically, between the years 2014 and
2016, we conducted ten individual, semi-structured interviews with the
following personas: Founding Director of the Israeli Courts Research Division;
Former Head of the Israel Bar Association Computing Committee; Head of
Administration of Courts Secretariats Division; Former Deputy Director of
Courts Administration; Former Member of the Legal-Net Design Team;
Information Technology and Services Consultant and Contractor—The
Administration of Courts; and several former Directors of Courts who served
in that capacity over different periods of times.22 This Article analyzes the
interviewees’ responses with regard to the design and implementation of
Legal-Net, so as to construct a historical account of the system’s development,
22. Interview with Keren Weinshall-Margel, Founding Dir., Isr. Courts Research Div. Ctr. at Israel
Supreme Court, in Jerusalem, Isr. (June 1, 2014); Interview with Haim Ravia, Former Head of the Isr. Bar
Ass’n Computing Comm., in Herzliya, Isr. (April 7, 2014); Interview with Shlomit Levy, Head of Admin. of
Courts Secretariats Div., in Jerusalem, Isr. (May 2, 2016); Interview with Zion Caspi, Former Deputy Dir. of
Courts Admin., in Beit Nekofa, Isr. (Mar. 26, 2014); Interview with Haim Gonen, Former Member of the
Legal-Net Design Team, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (May 18, 2014); Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14; Interviews
with Several Former Dirs. of Courts (different years), see infra notes 33, 47, 66, & 67.
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having in mind insights from law-and-technology literature regarding ways to
conceptualize the role of technology in judicial management. This endeavor is
distinct from neighboring interests in the use of technology for adjudication
(for example, for prediction of legal outcomes of particular judges)23 or for
assisting judges in decision-making (such as developing AI technologies).24 In
that respect, the focus of this study is novel. However, as we will show, some
of the concerns raised by judicial management platforms correspond with
concerns regarding litigation-related technologies.
II. WHAT IS LEGAL-NET?
Legal-Net is a cloud-based platform that handles the administration of all
first-instance and appellate court cases litigated in the Magistrate and District
courts in Israel, save for Supreme Court cases.25 It serves as a unified calendar
and time planner for these courts in their entirety. All court appointments,
hearings, and courtroom assignments are scheduled via Legal-Net. The system
also manages the judicial “warehouse” by tracking down all cases in the
system, classifying them according to several categories, and indicating the
stage they are at and the next action each file awaits.26
Legal-Net serves as the working station for judges. It is the site where all
court documents are filed (for example, transcripts of arguments in courts,
testimonies and cross-examinations) and where there is an official record of the
summoned witnesses, including the date they are expected to appear in court
and any details regarding their testimony. It is where judges’ drafts are
composed, and ultimately where the decisions on the various motions as well
as final resolutions are written, published, and stored. Judges are not
authorized to write something on their own computers; they are instructed to
work on Legal-Net. The platform also serves as a communication system for
lawyers and parties at large: therein they submit most legal documents,
including motions, affidavits, exhibits, briefs, replies, requests for summoning
a witness, and statement of appeals, to name a few. It is also where they
subsequently receive judicial input, including all decisions.
23. John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3052 (2014).
24. For an early discussion, see Robert J. Spagnoletti, Using Artificial Intelligence to Aid in the
Resolution of Socioscientific Disputes: A Theory for the Next Generation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 101 (1987); see also
Pamela S. Katz, Expert Robot: Using Artificial Intelligence to Assist Judges in Admitting Scientific Expert
Testimony, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 26–44 (2014); William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 275 (1998); Lyria Bennett
Moses & Janet Chan, Using Big Data for Legal and Law Enforcement Decisions: Testing the New Tools, 37
U.N.S.W. L.J. 643, 644 (2014); Theodore W. Ruger et al., Essay, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1150, 1152 (2004).
25. Generally, the system operates in a Microsoft environment and looks similar, if not identical, to other
Microsoft users’ desktop.
26. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. At that time
period, Levy and Yardeni were already employees of The Administration of Courts.
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Legal-Net has evidently transformed the manners in which judges
conduct their judicial duties. To illustrate, when a judge visits her Legal-Net
portal, she has instant access to her task-assignment log and is notified of the
tasks awaiting her attention.27 Furthermore, the judge can see her colleagues’
and other courts’ workloads and evolution of cases.28 More specifically, she
can see which cases are pending, and at what stage. As a communication
system, a large part of the judge’s interaction with the rest of the judiciary is
mediated through Legal-Net. Thus, for example, a judge is notified by the
system when a decision she has made is appealed and when that appeal is
resolved. The judge can monitor the appeal and its different stages by herself
through Legal-Net.29 Also, a judge may easily communicate with other judges
or officials, using the system’s interface, and exchange messages, set meetings,
or work jointly on a judgment when sitting in panels.30 Legal-Net also serves
as a portal for core legal services—primarily as an access point to commercial
online legal databases. Moreover, it serves itself as a database, as it stores all
documents in a searchable and retrievable format.
Since data is updated in real time, Legal-Net functions as a powerful
statistical platform capable of producing comprehensive and contemporary
reports in response to queries by authorized personnel. From a managerial
perspective the entire information and data stored by Legal-Net is visible to the
heads of the judiciary. Legal-Net allows them to have credible information on
the performance of individual judges or a given court, as well as the entire
judiciary’s caseload (provided, of course, that the data was entered correctly by
the registrars’ officers).31 For example, the system may analyze the synchronic
or diachronic caseload of individual judges, sections within courts, a single
court, or any court, and compare that section to others. It may offer
information about judicial time each legal motion consumed, or run statistical
analysis on the average (median, or any other denominator) time it takes
certain judicial entities to address certain decisions, rates of granting or
rejecting certain motions (per judge or per court), or any other data-based
query.32
Legal-Net caters not only to the needs of judges, or the judicial
administration, but also to those of the legal profession as a whole.33 Attorneys
may log into Legal-Net’s website, at their convenience and wherever they may

27. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
28. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Telephone Interview with Yarden Yardeni, Info. Tech.
and Servs. Consultant and Contractor, The Admin. of Courts (Nov. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Yardeni’s Telephone
Interview].
29. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
30. Interview with Yarden Yardeni, Info. Tech. and Servs. Consultant and Contractor, The Admin. of
Courts, in Caesarea, Isr. (July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Yardeni’s Second Interview].
31. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
32. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
33. Interview with Judge Boaz Okon, Former Dir. of Courts, in Tel-Aviv, Isr. (April 27, 2015);
Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
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be, using a “smart card” and a password. Once logged in, they may follow the
progression of their cases, submit documents/motions, pay court fees, review
future court dates, examine the history of past cases, review the court’s log,
and so on. A lawyer can see her firm’s pending cases with the click of a button.
She can also find out the status of a case, request rescheduling, and correspond
with other parties. As part of managing the adversarial process, Legal-Net is
configured to send out court documents and documents submitted to courts by
one side to other parties to the case. Attorneys are regularly notified by LegalNet upon the submission of a new document, at which point a link is sent to
them. Each side can see if the other opened the link and viewed the file.
Lawyers may download materials from the court’s files for their own use.
Technically, the system logs all such interactions.
As of 2017, there were approximately 3900 registered internal users (such
as judiciary-officials and judges), of which, on average, 2700 enter the system
on a daily basis.34 As for external users, there were 14,000 law offices
connected to Legal-Net with the above-mentioned “smart cards.”35
Approximately 75% of requests filed to courts by attorneys and 50% of all
submissions of materials to courts were done by remote electronic filing via
Legal-Net.36 These figures bear testament to the sea change in the production
of justice in Israel brought about by Legal-Net.37
We are unaware of any other judicial technology platform that integrates
so many different functions throughout the judiciary. Legal-Net controls the
submission, scheduling, and opinion-writing process across the entire Israeli
judicial system (with the exception of the Supreme Court). As one point of
comparison, the U.S. federal court system lacks a centralized technology
platform responsible for such a range of judicial management functions.38
Although the U.S. federal judiciary is developing a case management system
called Next Generation that integrates more judicial functions than did
previous technology frameworks,39 a variety of technological and institutional
design factors will prevent any single technology system from controlling as
much of the judicial process in the United States as Legal-Net does in Israel. A
single technology platform as powerful as Legal-Net in the American federal
system would undermine a long tradition of allowing different federal court
systems to set their own administrative policies and rules, as well as their own

34. Yardeni’s Telephone Interview, supra note 28.
35. Id.
36. It is actually more common for small firms to submit documents to courts’ secretariats solely via
Legal-Net, rather than manually. Id.
37. Id.
38. The current Strategic Plan for the United States Federal Judiciary acknowledges both centralized and
diffuse components of court technology platforms. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015).
39. Id.; see also John Brinkema & J. Michael Greenwood, E-Filing Case Management Services in the
U.S. Federal Courts: The Next Generation: A Case Study, 7 INTL. J. FOR CT. ADMIN. 3 (2015).
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pace of technological change.40 Even California, home to so many innovative
technology companies, lacks a single technology platform that so efficiently
incorporates different components of the judicial process.41
Needless to say, given the technological complexity of Legal-Net, the
system is not bug-free, and it has even been hacked at least once.42 Yet, it is
difficult to ignore its omnipresence and its comprehensive ability to channel
and govern the business of courts in Israel.
III. HOW DID LEGAL-NET COME TO BE? A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF ITS HISTORY &
FOUR APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGY
We turn now to sketch the historical evolution of the system, which—as
noted—has not been told in detail as of yet. The description that we put
forward is interpretative and dialectic to a considerable extent. Although there
is no evidence supporting the conclusion that the design of Legal-Net followed
an ex-ante unitary, overarching blueprint, in hindsight—ex-post—we can
detect four distinct principal policy approaches underlying its emergent design.
Hence, on the one hand, we will show that the design process and evolution of
Legal-Net has not followed a grand plan, but rather it has proceeded from one
semi-improvised solution to another. But, on the other hand, we will illustrate
how an ex-post analysis of the path leading to the shape Legal-Net has
eventually taken reveals a progression from one approach to technology to
another. To emphasize, this shift in approaches or attitudes was not preplanned, nor was it necessarily fully articulated as such by the players at the
time. Rather, this progression is revealed by interpreting, in retrospect, the shift
in identifying the problem (the solution of which technology was developed to
solve), the steps needed to be taken in order to develop and harness
technology, and the intended impact of the technological solutions. As we will
show, such approaches or attitudes have their own internal logic and set of
(usually unstated) assumptions; they also carry unintended consequences (as
would any regulatory approach).43
40. Telephone Interview with Retired Judge Jeremy Fogel, Exec. Dir., Berkeley Judicial Inst. (May 2,
2019). Judge Fogel explained that U.S. judges are embracing many technological improvements, while also
protecting the values of local court discretion and autonomy in setting certain technology policies. Id. Judge
Fogel also said that cybersecurity is one area in which there is more of an emphasis on nationwide best
practices, since any local vulnerabilities could have national effects. Id.
41. California’s many different state courts have different technology systems, and in fact some still use
paper systems. CAROL A. CORRIGAN & WILLIAM R. MCGUINNESS, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA’S
COURT SYS., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 214 (2017).
42. Eli Senyor & Maor Buchnik, Default: Hacker Broke into Israeli Courts System, CALCALIST (Sept.
10, 2012), https://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3582640,00.html (Heb.).
43. See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES (1997); Wanda J. Orlikowski, The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of
Technology in Organizations, 3 ORG. SCI. 398 (1992) (addressing some unintended consequences generated by
action and organizational politics in relation to technology); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994) (addressing the unintended consequences or
campaign finance regulation).
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The following subsections will show that, in the course of its
development, Legal-Net was made to address first administrative, later
structural, then managerial, and finally normative (value-laden) challenges
beleaguering the Israeli judiciary. By an “administrative” challenge, we mean
the bureaucratic, functional task of processing masses of cases, which
technology was harnessed to tackle. Under this approach, technology was
conceived as neutral in terms of values, ideology or power, and its
development conceptualized as a mere response to sub-optimal
administration.44 In the face of severe functional problems concerning case
backlogs and unequal distribution of cases, the remedy could have ostensibly
been limited to creating computerized case-inventories, along with enabling
judges to modernize their own work-environment by advancing their use of
computerized word-processing systems, digitized calendar, and access to
online commercial databases.45
The second approach—which we term the structural approach—took a
much more ambitious stand toward technology and the challenges facing the
judiciary. Under this approach, the challenges also included the aspiration to
structure, rather rigidly, judicial performance, in the belief that judges needed
to be more rigorously managed. Therefore, technology should encompass the
entire relevant domain or activity under regulation and should incorporate
command-and-control rules of “do’s” and “don’t’s.” In the Israeli case, the
technology was introduced not merely to assist but to structure the
transformation of the court system.46 As infrastructure for the regulation of
justices, the novel technology could not merely take the form of an Outlook
software, a Microsoft Windows operating systems with a Microsoft Office
suite, or some sort of a “Lotus for Organizations.”47 Rather, technology needed
to place hard limits on judicial sub-optimal (or perhaps evasive) maneuvers,
while providing an innovative, exciting platform for progress to a brighter
future premised on a fully digitized judicial process. On this approach,
administration officials seemed to regard novel technologies as a panacea to a
great many, if not all, of the ailments afflicting the Israeli judiciary,
optimistically discounting the limitations of contemporaneous technologies.
A third, more nuanced approach, viewed technology as a solution to a
limited set of managerial problems centered on coordination and integration.
This latter approach focused, more modestly, on the need to coordinate among
the innumerable dynamic parts of the judicial process. Under this approach,
technology is taken as a collaborative process; it is a space within which a
community of users is generated, integrated, and sustained. It is an

44. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s
First Interview, supra note 14.
45. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
46. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
47. Interview with Judge Dan Arbel, Former Deputy Dir. and Dir. of Courts, in Qiryat Ono, Isr. (Feb. 3,
2014).
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environment within which governmental identity is shaped and interaction with
the (private) profession is managed. Here, the appeal of technology stemmed
from the realization that the judiciary was facing not only internal
housekeeping difficulties or judicial regulation problems but also, if not
mainly, a challenge of synchronization (or lack thereof), and of integrating into
a workable whole the needs of the various sub-components and clients.
Technology was expected to provide a platform for joint action and a sense of
a unitary organization.48
The fourth approach to technology as a tool for judicial governance
revisited the apparent need for judicial processes to be structured, but from a
different perception of what “structure” is and what role technology ought to
play in such structure. Its starting point was unabashedly normative. It saw the
technology of Legal-Net as a tool to reflect, or even to project, a commitment
to implement and enhance a list of familiar liberal-democratic values, such as
transparency and access to justice.49 Legal-Net was seen as a value-enhancing
technological platform. Importantly, not only was the normative overtone of
this approach unique, but also the style of regulation it espoused. It saw
technology as regulating the system primarily via information—the very
knowledge Legal-Net produced—rather than by hard and fast rules in the style
of command-and-control regulation.
With this brief synopsis in mind, we turn to a more detailed analysis of
the four approaches and the annals of the development of Legal-Net.
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Our journey begins in the early 1990s, when the Israeli judicial system
was facing considerable managerial challenges, attributable to the rise in
backlog and failing management and technological infrastructures.50 Amazing
as it may sound, so dire was the judiciary’s technological state at that point that
the Administration of Courts was lost in the dark when it came to the most
basic of details: it lacked a sufficiently credible estimation of the number of

48. It has been suggested that technology is not a tool, but a reflection of a sought-after structure:
“[S]ociological approaches tend to emphasize either the potential of human agency in addressing the
implications of technological development or the structural dominance of technological systems and
logic. . . . [T]he technology is either the logic of the structure or a reflection of a newly formed structure.” See
Arthur Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
475, 478 (2007).
49. The fourth approach is also acknowledged by Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 48, at 480. (“[Some
believe that] technology is completely neutral, solely serving the intended purposes held for it by its
users. . . . [However, even under this approach,] human beings can and do direct the use of technology.”).
Thus viewed, the technology of Legal-Net can certainly be used to achieve the normative goals envisaged by
this approach.
50. See Dan Arbel, 21-[ מיחשוב בתי המשפט במאה הCourts Computation in the 21st Century], 29 JUD. SYS. J.
13 (1999) (Heb.); see also Meir Shamgar,[ הוועדה למיחשוב משפטי ואיחזור מידע משפטיThe Committee for Judicial
Computation and Restoration of Legal Information], 11 JUD. SYS. J. 13, 17–18 (1987) (detailing the
introduction of the Committee for Judicial Computation and Restoration of Legal Information in 1987).
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legal proceedings handled by the Israeli courts.51 Back then, the system relied
on two sources: one was handwritten logs, kept in each of the courts’
secretariat, listing the cases opened, motions submitted, and cases closed.
These ledgers, sometimes written in pencil to allow corrections, were the
backbone of the system. The second source was the Mainframe—a computer
that stored entries regarding opening and closing of cases (with general
reference to their nature, such as criminal or civil). The data was entered
manually at intervals, and output could be printed from the Mainframe itself.52
In the mid-1990s, administration officials took an initial step to
modernize judicial management by embarking on a preliminary computation of
courts’ secretariats with the introduction of Mainframe programs (beyond the
basic software already in use).53 These applications enabled the courts’
secretariats to provide the Administration with some elementary information at
intervals. Retrieving (and printing) this information required the suspension of
data input until the retrieval software was executed and the output was printed,
and therefore prior coordination was necessary. However, the Mainframe
software was inappropriate for the tasks at hand. For example, it did not track
the physical location of a file or the stage a proceeding reached. While it was
possible to know if court hearings began or ended (and with what result), there
was no way to track the various motions within cases, nor to ascertain whether
cases were dormant or not (and why).54
Particularly troubling was the fact that under the 1990s framework, there
was no central database or data clearinghouse through which to monitor, let
alone to control, the flow of cases in the organization beyond entry and exit.
The data was not uploaded to the Mainframe in real time, nor was there an
option to retrieve the information in real time from the various courts.
Moreover, there was no way to assess accurately the complexity of the
litigation: the time certain cases consumed, the ratio of motions per judge,
junctures where cases were likely to hit bottlenecks, and so on. Consequently,
it was impossible to design intelligent scheduling modalities and, more
specifically, it was difficult to predict how long conducting evidentiary
hearings would last in each case. Under such conditions, judges’ performance
could not be credibly systematized and streamlined.55
While the judiciary was plagued by aging infrastructure, law offices were
experimenting with novel technologies. Any contemporaneously appointed
51. Hadas Magen,  השופט דן ארבל, ראיון פרישה עם מנהל בתי המשפט.[ משרתם של שני אדוניםThe Servant of Two
Masters. Retirement Interview with Chief Justice, Dan Arbel], GLOBES (May 30, 2004),
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=800528 (Heb.).
52. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
53. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22. Mainframe is an operating system, that is, a collection of
programs that manages a computer system’s internal workings: its memory, processors, devices, and file
system. Id. Mainframe operating systems are commonly used in large organizations. Id.; see also RabinovichEiny, supra note 6, at 16–17.
54. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
55. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
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judge from the private sector would experience a technological step back upon
using court technology, as courts lacked the ability to access the fast-emerging
commercial legal databases, use networked word-processing systems, or
otherwise communicate with the parties.56 Judges expressed frustration with
the functionality of court technology.57
Generally, at the time, courts’ reactions to the mounting technological
challenge were local. Various presidents (or vice presidents) of courts
confronted technological problems as they emerged in their own jurisdiction.
For instance, in Tel Aviv, a local system, based on rather simple tools, was
developed to address the issue of case allocation (we shall return to this
system, called “Clouds,” in the following Section).58
Similarly, at the Supreme Court, an independent computerized database
was created in 2000.59 It allowed the Chief Justice to credibly ascertain, for the
first time, the number of cases filed in a certain timeframe, the number of cases
concluded, and the number of cases pending a decision.60 The Supreme Court’s
database enabled the Chief Justice at the time, Aharon Barak, to acquire
trustworthy information regarding the Court’s caseload, distribution of cases,
and additional administrative specifications.61 The novel database featured
“court log” software,62 which allocated cases among the justices and provided
a credible inventory of Supreme Court cases.63 The log made it possible to
carry out basic statistical analysis. As the Supreme Court log was installed,
Chief Justice Barak noted that, until that point in time, the Court had only a
rudimentary system lacking a center; only now, said Barak, did it have a
heart.64
Other courts tried to improve their reliance on the Mainframe software.
Some courts attempted to introduce a tool to enable access to the Mainframe
from the court halls, thereby allowing the Administration of Courts a better
sense of the day-to-day operation of courts. The idea was to enable
administrative personnel to update the Mainframe from the halls themselves,
close to real time. Additionally, as part of this development, direct lines of
56. See Nihan & Wheeler, supra note 5, at 664 (“Judges, and by acculturation their administrative staffs,
tend to give great weight to time-blessed administrative methods.”).
57. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. It is evident
that the judges’ frustration fueled the need for technological advancements.
58. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion Caspi’s, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First
Interview, supra note 14. Arbel’s interest in technology was widely known amongst his colleagues.
59. It was a Structured Query Language (SQL) database. The creation of the database and its
management were attributed to Judge Okon. See Yardeni’s Telephone Interview, supra note 28.
60. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30; Interview with
Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
61. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; see also infra
notes 128–135 and accompanying text. For more on Barak’s support of the computation process, see infra
Subpart III.D.
62. The “Court log” was also SQL-based, and it is still in use today. See supra note 59. Since first built, it
has been operated by the “Magic” application generator. Yardeni’s Telephone Interview, supra note 28.
63. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
64. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
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electronic communication were finally formed between courts’ secretariats and
court halls.65
Important as these attempts were, they were eclectic. Moreover,
responses relying on the Mainframe were precarious, as the Mainframe
suffered from several shortcomings. First, short of a full re-wiring and an
upgrade of the communication networks, the disconnect between courtrooms
and the secretariats in the numerous courts was endemic and debilitating.
Second, the Mainframe did not support new commercial legal databases that
were created at that time, which led to pressure from judges—eager to make
use of these databases—to upgrade the technological infrastructure. Third, the
Mainframe could provide only basic information (for example, it basically
logged only the initial filing and termination dates). Fourth, and most
devastatingly, the Mainframe began to crash regularly. Hardware and software
were outdated and had to be upgraded or replaced. Our interviews reveal that
in the late 1990s, the Administration’s IT team came to work each morning
hoping the system would survive the day. As noted, in the mid-1990s the
backlog in cases increased at an alarming rate,66 and all agreed a swift response
was needed. The lack of credible data was seen as a major hurdle.
Faced with such informational deficiencies, the judiciary’s top officials
embarked, at the end of the 20th century, on a few technological initiatives in
the hope of paving the road to proper management of the court system.67 As
part of the overall endeavor to address both issues—the need to network the
system and the necessity to better manage the case flow within the system—
the recently appointed Director of the Court Administration, Judge Arbel,68
65. The Mainframe was originally located in the IBM building in Tel-Aviv, and not in a court or the
Administration’s building. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22. The standalone computers could not
communicate with computers in other courtrooms, judges’ chambers, or secretariats. Connecting courtrooms to
the secretariats allowed for acquiring basic information regarding, for example, dates for particular procedures.
The information that could be shared was still basic. For example, as it was not clear from the Mainframe
whether parties received documents from the courts. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. There was
an attempt to use the Mainframe also to assign case numbering. This function was traditionally handled
manually by the different secretariats. The handwritten master log was the only source with which one could
match a certain case number to the rest of the information about the case.
66. According to Arbel, during Ravivi’s term, the overall caseload of the Israeli judiciary was 1,200,000
cases that were handled by 400 judges. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Moshe Gal,
Former Dir. of Courts, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (Feb. 24, 2016). For an explanation of the possible reasons for the
increase in litigation, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
67. Those initial steps were taken under the guidance of Director Ravivi (1994–1998) and his successor,
Judge Dan Arbel (1998–2002). As part of the effort to modernize the judiciary’s technological infrastructure, a
group of Israeli judges took part in a fourteen-day seminar in the Institute for the Study and Development of
the Legal System in San Francisco in March 2000. The seminar was also attended by several American judges.
See Letter from the Chamber of Aharon Barak, Chief Justice, to Judges Who Took Part in the S.F. Seminar,
(Jan. 11, 2000) (on file with author); see also Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion
Caspi, supra note 22. Israeli delegations also visited Singapore, where “E-filing” and “Paperless” Courts had
already been introduced. Interview with Judge Yitzhak Ravivi, Former Director of Courts, in Herzliya, Isr.
(Feb. 3, 2014).
68. Prior to his appointment, Judge Arbel was the President of the magistrate courts in Tel Aviv and The
Center, and prior to that he served as the deputy to Judge Ravivi who was, at the time, the president of these
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introduced the Israeli Courtrooms Management System (CMS), which was
designed to provide a better assessment of the judicial workload.69
The CMS made computerized legal databases available to judges not only
while sitting in courtrooms (and using the standalone computer placed therein)
but also while working in chambers.70 The basic idea was to end the use of
standalone computers and connect the separate courtrooms to one another, as
well as the courtrooms to the court secretariats. Additionally, the CMS took the
assemblage of information regarding judges’ and courts’ performance to a new
level: it could indicate how many cases were pending in each court, to whom
each case was assigned within each court, and the status thereof. For the first
time in the history of the Israeli judiciary, the system’s chiefs—primarily the
Chief Justice and the Director of Courts—could obtain a somewhat realistic
understanding of the different courts’ caseloads.
But it was clear from the outset that there was only so much CMS could
achieve, even once it was fully implemented in the numerous courts. It was
essentially a patch, put in place to meet needs unmet by the Mainframe by
connecting courts’ computers to each other. Thus, expectedly, as the system
was developed and implemented, the CMS technological infrastructure began
to malfunction as well. By 1998 it became clear that a major overhaul was
required, and that a new technology must be installed.71
But before we turn to the response of the system to this sense of
impending crisis, we must note that the short-lived CMS had an unintended
impact: it alerted judges to the relationship between “housekeeping”
technologies, the regulation of the judicial functions and, ultimately, judicial
behavior. While CMS addressed obvious administrative needs—such as the
need to connect courtrooms to registrar offices, and chambers to courtrooms,
as well as to connect them all to the commercial legal databases—it was also
about using technology to generate credible statistical knowledge about
caseloads and backlogs. While the old Mainframe provided basic data, CMS
was designed to improve that dimension under the premise that technology
should be harnessed to better manage the judicial process by generating

courts. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47. In those capacities, Arbel worked toward local solutions,
primarily based on seeking ways to network local courts. Id. It was based on this experience that upon
appointment to the position of Director, Arbel sought to network the judicial system, building upon Windows’
capabilities. Id.
69. At the same time, Professor Niv Ahituv of the Tel-Aviv University School of Management devised a
“strategic plan for information systems and computation of the courts.” The “Ahituv Report,” submitted in
November 1996, advocated key elements of E-filing with a view to reducing the number of paper court files,
increasing storage space within the courts, preventing file disappearance, and reducing attorneys’ visits to the
courts. Additionally, the computation of courts secretariats also advanced the abovementioned computation of
the Supreme Court. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
70. These actions had great practical significance as they allowed, for example, for the convenient
altering of courtrooms during a trial, an option that hardly existed prior. But still, it remained only on the local
computer network level. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note
14.
71. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
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reliable data in real time, including data regarding the productivity of each
judge.72
In fact, it did not take much for the judges themselves to become aware of
the importance of the short episode of the CMS. They were quick to realize its
novel managerial dimension as soon as it became known that the CMS
generated relatively detailed monthly reports regarding their productivity. Not
long thereafter, judges gathered that their distinct performance could be—and,
in fact, was being—monitored by the heads of the judicial system.73
Furthermore, it became evident to judges that the reports’ findings had
consequences. Notably, judges with weak performance reports were
summoned to Chief Justice Barak and the Director of Courts.74 Although the
content of such meetings was not made public, it seems reasonable to assume
that judges perceived these meetings, which were prompted by negative
performance reports, as indicating the advent of a new, higher level of
accountability over the judiciary. The publication of the report generated some
resentment, and a number of judges even expressed their bitter sentiments75 in
tandem with their objection to other managerial reforms that they saw as
limiting their own control over the judicial process.76 As we shall see next,
however, for others this backlash indicated that something must be done in
order to reign in inefficient judges whose performance was held to be out of
line.
B. THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE
After it became evident that a technological overhaul was required, two
interrelated questions had to be answered. The first was about the “how”: was

72. See Nihan & Wheeler, supra note 5, at 661 (“[T]echnology can improve the organization’s—in this
case, the court’s —ability to collect and analyze data, thus enhancing efficiency.”).
73. For a sequential approach, which suggests that different ways of managing and monitoring judges
pose a threat to the judicial system, see Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self Help,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 402 (1989) (“Judges are presently beset by pressures to subject other judges to sanctions
for substandard conduct, to seek more professional management by judicial technocrats . . . . The ascendance
of the management-governance function, whether by collegial group, technocrat, or committee, poses, if
untouched, an insidious threat to the judicial functioning of the judiciary.”).
74. As the person who was in charge, Caspi was aware of the influence that the reports had on Judges.
Caspi’s interview, supra note 44.
75. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22.
76. Judges resented also Director Arbel’s initiative to institute “the Focal Judge” Program, according to
which cases would be first dealt by a Focal Judge who was able to discern the focus of the case, ascertain the
scope and nature of the dispute, decide whether case could be settled, or whether it should be directed to
further litigation. It was argued that the split between a Focal Judge and the judge, responsible for disposing of
the case, only duplicated judicial procedures. Indeed, today the idea of Focal Judge is hardly used in courts
beyond the criminal process. On Focal Judges, see Kenneth Mann,  הסדרי טיעוןת הרשאות שווא:סדר דין פלילי מנהלי
[ של אשמים ופיקוח שיפוטיAdministrative Criminal Procedure: Plea Agreements, False Convictions of Guilty
Defendants and Judicial Review], in צדק במערכת המשפטית? חוק פלילי וסדרי דין פליליים בישראל – בעיות ואתגרים
[CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ISRAEL—PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES] 229, 245–46 (Alon
Harel ed., 2017) (Heb.); see also THE PUBLIC DEFENSE OFFICE, 2014 [ דוח שנתי לשנANNUAL REPORT FOR 2014]
(2015) (Heb.); Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47.
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the project at issue to be carried out by the organs of the State? Or, rather,
should the Administration of Courts turn to the private market in search of
technological solutions? Should the Administration just resign itself to
solutions that can be bought off the shelf? The second question was more
fundamental, focusing on the purpose: what should be the primary underlying
demands to which the new technology should respond—administrative and
productivity-oriented, or structural and regulative? More specifically, the
search for purpose required addressing the policy that should undergird the
necessary technological transformation—should it be the administrative
outlook seeking to enhance productivity by putting in place networked
scheduling and inventory technologies as the be all and end all of the system?
Or should the technology be designed to address other concerns of the system
as well, beyond warehousing, scheduling, and productivity tools? Under the
former approach, it was better to focus on one aspect of the system and adopt a
purely administrative look geared towards efficiency. Under the latter, it was
better to adopt a more holistic approach and address productivity among other
goals (such as fair distribution of cases within the system). The latter approach
also suggested that technology and its development process may be used not
only as a mean to achieve predetermined goals but also as a tool for devising
and prioritizing the goals themselves.77
It was Judge Arbel, the Director of Courts and an avid aficionado of
technology (with a background in tech support), who seized the opportunity.
He sought not only to technologically innovate the system but also to “think
big” by digitizing the entire structure, thereby harnessing technology to
regulate judges. It was also clear to him that the state should play a leading role
in custom-designing the system.
Recall that complaints about judicial backlog were mounting.78 The
judge-to-case ratio plummeted and, equally importantly, the relative
77. See Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 48, at 497 (suggesting that technology can do both, “the dicta
that ‘code is law’ represents such an explicit attempt to see how a certain form of technology—the software
and hardware technologies that enable the Internet—can constrain or enable certain forms of individual
behavior. Hence the code can potentially be directed by regulators in such a way to arrive at more optimal
forms of policy.”).
78. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Interview with
Yitzhak Ravivi, supra note 67. We should note that in the 1990’s, Israel saw a generational transformation.
The population dramatically increased, as a result of immigration, primarily from the former Soviet Union, but
also from Ethiopia. See, e.g., Dvora Hacohen, Mass Immigration and the Demographic Revolution in Israel, 8
ISR. AFF. 177, 182–185 (2001). Population growth (and the accompanying frictions) led to an increase in civil
and criminal disputes. Concomitantly, Israel had emerged from a deep economic crisis, experiencing
substantial growth in economic activities and significant processes of privatization. See DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ,
 חוק וממשל במדינה משתנה- צרכן-נתין-[ אזרחCITIZEN-SUBJECT-CONSUMER—LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN A
CHANGING STATE] 77–127 (2012) (Heb.); ITZHAK GALNOOR ET AL., PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN ISRAEL: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE] (2015) (Heb.); EYAL PELEG,
[ הפרטה כפרסום – גורמים פרטיים בחוק הציבוריPRIVATIZATION AS PUBLICIZATION—PRIVATIZED BODIES IN PUBLIC
LAW] (2005) (Heb.). Market-based economic growth is often accompanied by a rise in litigation. See Gerhard
Clemenz & Klaus Gugler, Macroeconomic Development and Civil Litigation, 9 EU. J.L. & ECON. 215, 216
(2000). Furthermore, as technology evolved and with the acceleration of globalization, economic (and
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percentage of lawyers in society climbed at the turn of the century: by the late
1990’s and early 2000’s, Israel had many more lawyers per capita.79 As
lawyers became more entrepreneurial—as a result of the increased
competition, in response to a suppressed demand, or as part of the development
of more sophisticated causes of action that usually follow economic growth—
some judges did not keep up with the rise of litigation and the intensifying
demands for swift resolutions. Little wonder that our interviews reveal that
presidents of courts felt, around that period in particular, that prevailing
judicial management practices should be critically revisited.80
Director Arbel realized that expanding the administrative perspective to
include a regulative dimension may not only bring courts up to par with law
offices and meet warehousing concerns, but it may also assist in mitigating
some of the root problems afflicting, in his view, the system as a whole. These
included the issue of regulating the manner in which judges (and lawyers) were
performing their duties, so that the legal process would achieve greater
efficiency. He therefore wholeheartedly embraced the structural perspective,81
premised on the notion that technology offers an architecture for command and
control.82
Arbel, Director of Courts as of 1998, based his vision on his own
experience as the President of the Magistrate Courts of Tel Aviv-Jaffa and
Central Districts.83 In that latter capacity, Arbel initiated and oversaw the
criminal) misfeasance became more sophisticated. See, e.g., URI RAM, THE GLOBALIZATION OF ISRAEL:
MCWORLD IN TEL AVIV, JIHAD IN JERUSALEM (2005). As a sociological matter, the rise in caseload can be
attributed to the further diversification of the society and the failure of the hegemony-based social structures
that offer dispute resolution outside the court system to cope with the increase in demand for dispute resolution
within and across social groups. Social scientists and legal historians have claimed that disputes are litigated
when other forms of dispute resolutions fail. These alternative forms include turning to respected figures, who
are held as honest resolvers of disputes pursuant to the values of the community. Such a system works so long
as the disputes are largely occurring within the community, or so long as one community enjoys a hegemonic
status, and therefore other communities follow its practices. See e.g., Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of
Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984). Israel, a divided
society, moved from a collectivist ethos and socialist tendencies towards a neo-liberal market-based economy
in the 1980s. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Israel’s ‘Constitutional Revolution’” The Legal Interpretation of
Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998), 427–
428). This ostensibly, led to an increase in commercial disputes—some of which were complex and across
economic sectors—and a decrease of reliance on non-litigious forms of dispute resolution.
79. Raanan Sulitzeanu-Keinan et al., Judicial Burden—A Comparative Study of 17 States (Haifa Center
for Public Management and Policy 2007) (Heb.).
80. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Caspi’s interview, supra note 44; Gonen’s interview,
supra note 60; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
81. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47.
82. The literature on command-and-control regulation is vast. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart,
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
103, 103-18 (1998) and Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1333 (1985).
83. Arbel served as the president of the Tel-Aviv and Central Magistrate Courts in the years 1994–1998.
See
Dan
Arbel,
ISR.
JUD.
AUTH.,
https://judgescv.court.gov.il/898584ba-645e-e811-81050050568a6817%D7%93%D7%9F-%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%9C (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (Heb.).
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regular operation of the “Performance Report System” (nicknamed
“Clouds”).84 Clouds was designed to assist Arbel in managing “his” courts by
allocating cases among judges and considering judges scheduling requests. The
Clouds system had first taken baby steps in structuring Arbel’s courts’
administration by generating notifications when a judge’s roster showed
significant delays or when a case lingered excessively in the pre-trial phase.85
Arbel’s performance system was better than the manual alternative but it was
outdated from a technological and managerial perspective, and it was clearly
inadequate for the management of the entire Israeli judiciary. However, the
idea was there—using technology to solve the core problems of the judiciary:86
caseload, case-management, and the lack of a proper clearinghouse. Moreover,
the technological approach was there, too—using technology as a channeling
means, whereby boundaries were set to ensure judges’ compliance with their
superiors’ expectations. Thus, whereas the impetus was administrative in
nature, in the sense that the turn to technology was originally informed by
administrative concerns, within Arbel’s vision the policy goals were perceived
on a grander scale.
An ambitious—perhaps overly ambitious—decision was made to embark
on a striking project that would digitize and standardize the registrars of all
courts, control the scheduling of cases, and structure the entire system’s
warehouse where cases resided after being launched and before conclusion. It
would also create a networked judiciary where chambers, courtrooms, and
registrar offices were on the same network (per court, and with an option to
establish a national network). It would provide more complete statistical data.
Crucially, the system was also expected to structure the judicial process;
namely, the system’s architecture had to ensure that judges processed cases
according to a pre-ordained procedure, which took into account their caseload
and pending motions.
Furthermore, so complete was the faith in technology as the bridge to a
better and brighter future that the system was expected to usher in a fully
digitized judicial process. This emerging vision was of wall-to-wall “E-filing”
or a “Paperless Court.” It contemplated a comprehensive system through which
the entire legal proceeding—the submission of court evidence included—
would be digitized.87 The Paperless Court had several objectives, such as

84. The nickname was derived from the system’s screen background, which resembled clouds. See
Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
85. A case was considered “delayed” whenever no further session was set (for example, for sentencing or
hearing), even though it had already gone through the summary phase. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note
14.
86. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 34–35, who suggests that technology will increase efficiency,
and will solve judicial problems. (“Efficiency is promoted by digital technologies on many levels. Court
proceedings become more efficient for the parties involved, for their attorneys, for the individual judges and
for the civil justice system as a whole.”).
87. An early version of the idea of digitization of the legal process can be seen in Nihan & Wheeler,
supra note 5, at 672. (“[T]he Judicial Center has been able to develop and test a further procedure for efficient
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reducing the number of court files, thereby alleviating storage space shortage,
preventing file disappearance, improving archival searches, and reducing to a
minimum attorneys’ visits to the courts.88 The guiding rationale was selfevident: once all components of the process are digitized, judges can easily
access any needed materials (ranging from evidence to submissions and from
past precedents to decisions in similar matters by other courts). Consequently,
considerable bureaucratic hassle is spared, and judicial output is more
coherent, timely, and reliable, without hand-written notes on cluttered and
misplaced papers.
In accordance with this bold scheme, by the early 2000s the
Administration was in the process of conducting a rather fascinating
experiment of the “Virtual Courtroom,” whose pilot was launched in May
2001 at the Ramla Magistrate Court (in the late Judge Shmuel Baruch’s
court).89 The pilot lasted for a year and a half and served as a field test.90 It was
based on experimental, innovative technologies not commercially available
anywhere else at the time. The pilot included the scanning of written evidence
(or photographing physical evidence) as it was submitted to court and
electronically storing it as an integral part of the case file. It also included onscreen, live presentation of court records, videotaping of testimonies, and the
video recording of courtroom interactions.
In July 2000, as the preparations for the pilot were underway, and as the
Mainframe and CMS were faltering, the Administration published a public
tender, inviting companies to develop, operate, and maintain a computerized
infrastructure for the entire Israeli judiciary.91 It was decided that the State
lacked the capacity to develop the infrastructure itself, but should play a
leading role in its design.92 The tender specified the following features of the
requested infrastructure: computation of the courts secretariats’ standard
activities (such as documentation and registration of files), setting dates for
court management . . . the court’s docket sheet information is electronically recorded in the main Courtran
computers, thus creating the official docket, albeit an electronic docket, of their cases.”).
88. These objectives were compatible with Arbel’s technological vision. See Interview with Dan Arbel,
supra note 47.
89. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
90. See Caspi’s Interview, supra note 44 (arguing that this pilot provoked a lot of interest amongst
lawyers and judges alike).
91. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47 (claiming that the tender was another step in the
technological evolution). The decision to launch the ambitious tender was against the advice of the Israel Bar
Association, whose standing Computation Committee was headed by adv. Ron Gazit. As the Administration
considered launching a tender to technologically overhaul the Israeli judiciary, Gazit and the Committee met
regularly with Judge Arbel and Administration personnel. The Committee members read the tender draft, to
which they presented many objections and remarks. As later events would reveal, the Committee’s objections
were certainly not unfounded. The Israel Bar had self-sufficiently created “Bar-Net”—its own tool that would
have allowed lawyers to electronically submit files to courts. However, the endeavor did not succeed due to
logistical and financial difficulties. Thus, Legal-Net remained the sole option of ‘E-Filing’ or paperless court.
See Interview with Adv. Haim Ravia, former head of the Israel Bar Association Computing Committee, supra
note 22.
92. See Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.

April 2020]

THE USE AND MISUSE OF TECHNOLOGY

613

court sessions, and issuance of summons (all of which had been done thus far
manually); credible use of electronic filing (with the use of electronic signature
mechanisms); digitizing storage space; and development of statistical and data
management capabilities. Since most of the technologies needed for these
features were not on the shelf, the State reserved the right to supplement the
just-mentioned requirements by adding further details as the system developed.
At the beginning, the tender initiative seemed promising and exciting. It
was a truly innovative venture, with the potential of leading the Israeli
judiciary to the new frontier where no judiciary had gone before. Moreover,
the Finance Ministry—usually a conservative body weary of risky moves with
public funds—agreed to secure a hefty sum of money for the project. The
Finance Ministry’s endorsement was seen by those involved as an indication
that the planned course of action was indeed promising.93 Alas, future events
would reveal how over-optimistic State officials involved in the endeavor had
been (or, conversely, the extent of resources actually needed for such grand
innovation). In order to understand the failure of this bold move, which had left
the system tethering on the brink of returning to pen-and-paper ledgers, three
developments should be noted.
First, during the months following the publication of the tender, it became
clear that the tender and the discussions surrounding it stirred critical reactions
among judges.94 As a general matter, the judges were not eager to cooperate
with the process,95 as they did not see how their needs were fully integrated in
its design.96 Already at the outset, as some consultation with judges began to
take place, judges realized that in fact the anticipated infrastructure might
restrict their discretion regarding case management, shifting it to “the
computer” in the vein of the CMS and the Clouds, only on a larger scale.97 For
example, the system was projected to strictly manage case allocation without
accepting overrides from judges. Equally troubling, from the perspective of
judges, it could potentially lock judges in by forcing them to conclude the
business the system defined as urgent (or overdue) before they could move to
other cases. It would thus enforce upon judges a set of tasks they must
complete, with deadlines, or else they would not be able to proceed with any
93. See Okon’s Interview, supra note 33; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. Both dispute this
decision in hindsight.
94. See Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
95. It should be noted, however, that several of the court’s secretariats were also unwilling to cooperate
with the endeavor, as they were concerned that the projected technological revolution would be detrimental to
their future employment. Caspi’s Interview, supra note 44.
96. For example, judges had not played an active part in the design stage of the secretariat’s computation
process. See supra text accompanying note 47; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
97. Gonen’s Interview, supra note 60; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14; Okon’s Interview, supra
note 33. For an example of American judges expressing fear that management structures would undermine
their judicial discretion, see Carolyn Dubay, A Country Without Courts: Doing More with Less in Twenty-First
Century Federal Courts, 48 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 531, 536 (2013) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as stating
that “bureaucratization and increased management structures will leave the judges less freedom to exercise
personal judgment”).
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other task—and of course with their presidents (and the Director of Courts)
aware of such infractions. As a result, some judges expressed their resentment
towards the project.98 It became evident that designing and later implementing
the new infrastructure went well beyond the scope of housekeeping. At the
same time, as with the judicial reaction to the CMS, some saw judges’ hostility
as an indication of the need to resort to such technology to ensure
accountability and strict judicial compliance.99
Second, as extant technology was not yet ready, especially if expected to
be compatible with the Paperless Court vision,100 there was little comparative
experience upon which to rely. Unsurprisingly, the Paperless Court attracted
some criticism. It was argued that it was too pretentious and beyond the reach
of judges, most of whom were clearly not as technologically proficient as
Judge Baruch (nor were they as technophiles as Director Arbel).101 Judge
Baruch himself thought that the actual use of technology in his court diverted
his attention away from judging.102 But most importantly, it was established
that the technology was not advanced enough at that stage to meet the
requirement of a fully digitized courtroom.103 By late 2002 the test was
terminated.104
And third, project leaders realized early on that, as there was no blueprint
outlining the specific, detailed requirements the system would have to meet, it
would have to be devised on the fly. This meant that the asking price submitted
in the tender was projected to reflect a rather high degree of uncertainty.105
Little wonder, then, that only one company, Electronic Data Systems (EDS),
had responded to the tender. Its offering was higher than the Administration’s
original estimation of the project, causing the Tenders Committee to reject the
offer, thus essentially bringing the public tender process to an end.106
98. Okon claimed he had no control over the system’s performance even though he was one of its
planners. But see Jennifer Chandler, The Autonomy of Technology: Do Courts Control Technology or Do They
Just Legitimize Its Social Acceptance? 27 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 339, 341 (2007) (“Instead, the idea reflects
a sense that despite our belief that we direct the development of technologies and choose whether or not to use
them, this control is more or less illusory.”). In regard to judges’ approach to technology influencing their
work, see Coffin, supra note 73, at 399 (“Even when the marvels of the electronic age are made available to
judges, the very bulk of information obtainable, the plethora of uses suggested, and the rapidity of
communication may be seen to threaten the traditional processes of deliberation, discussion, and decision.”).
99. Caspi’s Interview, supra note 44; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30; For an argument in
favor of more judicial transparency, see also Lynn LoPucki, Court System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV.
481, 538 (2008–2009).
100. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
101. These views were also made, amongst others, by Adv. Ron Gazit. Gazit, the head of the Computation
Committee of the Israel bar association at that time and one of the leading professionals in his field. See Moshe
Gorali, The High Price of the “Paperless Court” Vision, HAARETZ (Aug. 17, 2011)
https://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.795216 (discussing the paperless court in May 2002); see also Interview with
Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
102. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
103. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
104. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
105. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
106. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
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Following the cancellation of the tender, the funds reserved for the
project returned to the Finance Ministry.107 The Administration of Courts went
back to the drawing board, scrambling to make the best out of the core ideas
underlying the tender. Its response laid the grounds for what later came to be
known as Legal-Net.
C. THE MANAGERIAL-INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The months following the tender’s failure were rather chaotic. The
Administration was still committed to the project. It determinedly assured the
Knesset (Israel’s parliament) that things were still moving along, given the
mounting critique,108 and while the secured budget for the venture was
“retrieved” by the Finance Ministry, in the wake of the tender’s collapse,
attempts were made to guarantee a yearly budget for the development of the
judiciary technological apparatus. As the Administration tried to figure out
what went wrong, four factors stood out. First, awareness that sitting judges
should be better integrated into the design of the sought-after technologies
sunk in.109 Second, and related, the key players—the Administration, courts’
presidents, the IT team—realized that technology should not necessarily be
used in a command-and-control fashion, by rigidly ordering judges how to
conduct their business, in order to minimize judicial resistance.110 Third, the
Administration and the IT team understood that while a sweeping
technological vision was necessary, it was more advisable to treat the promise
embedded in novel technologies more modestly,111 as well as to proceed one
module at a time in the hope of allowing for better configuration of tested
technologies and their smoother integration in the existing infrastructure.112
And lastly, it was recognized that the specifications of the system should be at
a much greater detail in order to minimize economic uncertainty for software
companies and thus accommodate market concerns.113 At the same time,
Arbel’s vision regarding the managerial uses of data was already well

107. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47.
108. See The Protocols of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on October 20, 2003,
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Huka/Pages/CommitteeProtocols.aspx (Heb.).
109. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33;
Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
110. As a general matter, it appears that the Administration sought to pursue the development of the
judiciary’s technology with as little resistance as possible. This probably explained the fact that it made
significant advances in this area in the less hostile territories of the secretariats of the criminal and civil
departments, as well as that of the labor and traffic courts, since both were less opposed to the integration of
modern technology. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22.
111. See Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 48, at 490 (“[T]echnology is only a tool and has no inherent
structure.”).
112. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22.
113. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
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entrenched. So was his recognition that unified, fully integrated and networked
technologies must be developed for the system to be properly managed.114
As circumstances imposed themselves on the Administration of Courts,
the IT team realized it had to prioritize the most urgent administrative
necessities without a grand design.115 But it was not clear how to prioritize,
given that the previous working assumption was that the entire system would
be overhauled. As a first emergency step, three technology companies signed
an agreement for the maintenance of the existing technological
infrastructure,116 but it was unclear what “maintenance” included, as fixing
malfunctions depended on required technological advancements.
Since a much higher level of specification had to be attained, and the
incremental approach was the preferred option, the IT professional team,
humbled by its hitherto unrealistic methodology, contacted software companies
to determine what it would take to develop the various necessary modules. At
the same time, in order to ensure the “buy-in” of the various stakeholders, the
IT and the Administration of Courts realized it was necessary to comprise a
detailed breakdown of the exact needs of various components of the system
and its members – judges and administrators alike. With that in mind, the IT
team took the lead in trying to determine the various features the system would
have to deliver, and their relative priorities.117
Under this approach, the regulative function of technology appears in
reverse order: because technological development—as the Administration
slowly realized—required clear and precise details, a process for establishing
these details had to first be put in place. Since no one segment of the
organization had, up to that point, a clear understanding of the specific
workflows of each and every segment of the entire organization, and as, upon
completion, the cooperation of the various segments would be necessary, the
Administration embarked on a rather intensive process of consultation.118 The
process encouraged participation and deliberation among some members of the
various segments of the system. But even more importantly, as technological
solutions were contemplated, questions about ways to integrate the various
components were also raised and discussed. Similarly, questions about
permissions, access, control, and override were also considered.
The processes of developing specifications for the various technological
features had an interesting organizational impact: it generated a sense of
belonging to a whole. The process called upon the various segments of the
system to articulate their needs, which cultivated a sense of a community. A
114. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22 (both
demonstrating, once again, the importance of judicial authority to the technological team).
115. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22 (emphasizing
the technological team’s need in creating interim, yet modular, solutions).
116. They were Ness Technologies Ltd., IBM Global Services (IGS), and Taldor. Yardeni’s First
Interview, supra note 14; Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22.
117. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
118. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
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similar dynamic would later repeat itself, as the design of each of the modules
was contemplated and later developed and implemented, technology was
harnessed to serve as a platform shared by all segments of the bureaucratic
apparatus, thereby bringing them together and constructing a sense of a unified
organizational identity.119 Technology—participation in its development by
way of expressing the administrative needs, deciding collaboratively on
priorities and designing synchronized workflows—was instrumental in
transforming the court system into a unit in and of itself.120 Each component of
the system was present in the online, networked system, and was aware of the
challenges the other components were facing. A different approach to
technology therefore emerged: technology as an integrative platform, where
management pursues organizational goals, related to establishing a sense of
shared mission and common practices of communication about such mission.
It should be emphasized, however, that under this approach technology
does not only integrate, it also generates power and hierarchy, albeit
indirectly.121 Technology determines who may know what about whom, and
who may be authorized to do what with respect to whom and under what
conditions. The relationship between technology and power-structures had
been directly and vividly visible to all under the previous approach—the topdown “grand-design” approach that sought to harness technology to erect
“walls” in order to herd judges in. Under the approach to technology as a
professional-community-building tool, power and hierarchy were less obvious,
but nonetheless very much present. Access and permission rules were
discussed, and a decision had to be taken by the heads of the organization and
then justified to the rest of the members. It is this aspect that forced the men
and women working on the system to consider the fourth perspective: the
values perspective.
D. THE VALUES PERSPECTIVE
Our research reveals that Legal-Net cannot be fully understood without
realizing that the policy choices embedded therein consciously reflect
values.122 Pursuant to the consultation processes, and having in mind the initial
119. For a description of a “Facilitator-type” of regulation and of regulator, see Yair Sagy, A Triptych of
Regulators: A New Perspective on the Administrative State, 44 AKRON L. REV. 425, 432 (2011) (“[He or she]
facilitates public action by providing civic fora where fact-gathering and fact-processing mechanisms are
employed.”).
120. For a discussion of “judicial production as team work,” see Ginsburg & Garoupa, supra note 17, at
231.
121. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Foreword: Technology’s Transformation of the Regulatory Endeavor, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1315 (2011) (“[R]egulators have taken to heart the cyberspace lesson that ‘[i]f
code is law . . . ‘control of code is power,’ enlisting technological capacity in the pursuit of policy aims”
(second and third alterations in original) (footnote omitted)). According to this approach, technology produces
power; the more advanced stage is the government understanding that control of technology is the control
itself.
122. Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (2003) (“[T]he
single most salient feature of cyberspace is its ability to embed controls that resist or reinforce values that we
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push-back from the judges, the normative dimension of the design was
recognized by its designers, who took pains to ensure that the value choices
ingrained therein would be made explicit and could be explained and defended.
This latter perspective revealed itself most clearly around November
2003, a point in time which marked a distinctly new phase in the evolving
design of Legal-Net. This phase was associated above all with Judge Boaz
Okon, Arbel’s future successor, and the man who could be rightly considered
Legal-Net’s chief designer.123 It was on Okon’s watch that it was decided that
the visionary Paperless Court would be replaced by a system that would center
on paperless communication, but not necessarily digitize the interactions in the
courthouse itself – at least not at the first stage. Moreover, it was Okon who
decided, together with the IT team, that in order to proceed with the
incremental approach the legal process itself had to be analyzed, accordingly,
in greater detail.124
Okon had become deeply involved with the development of the modules
following the collapse of the ambitious tender during the transitional stage
detailed above under the Integrative Perspective.125 Back then, the design team
requested that a judge be assigned to closely accompany its work.126 Okon
seemed to be a natural choice for the task, having been in charge of the
creation of the abovementioned Supreme Court log during his term as the
Supreme Court Registrar.127
According to Okon, however, in his capacity as the accompanying judge,
he merely tried to implement Chief Justice Barak’s vision of Legal-Net, which
was premised on certain principles.128 It appears that although Chief Justice
Barak was far from being tech-savvy—until his retirement he wrote his
judgment with a pencil on paper—he did consider the development of a sound
judicial-management system as highly important. Chief Justice Barak
approached most questions regarding the role of the judiciary with values in
mind—primarily liberal democratic values. Hence, the principles thereafter
embedded in the systems were—and henceforth will be—referred to as “the

bring to cyberspace. We must understand the manner in which these values are resisted or reinforced if we are
to continue the experiment of self-government, where self-conscious choice determines the law we live life
subject to.”). Lessig argues that the uniqueness of cyberspace is in assimilating the values that humans
themselves brought with them when they built this space. Id. As indicated in the text, we agree, of course.
123. According to Yardeni, it was predetermined that the design process would take thirty-eight months.
See Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. On July 15, 2004, Judge Boaz Okon replaced Judge Arbel as
Director of the Courts.
124. See Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
125. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33;
Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
126. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
127. See The Protocols of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on July 13, 2004,
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Huka/Pages/CommitteeProtocols.aspx (Heb.). It seems that
Okon’s involvement with the Supreme Court’s computation was highly praised by Knesset Members during a
session of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee dealing with the computation of the courts.
128. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
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Barak principles.” However, our research reveals that Okon played an
instrumental role, not only because he participated in the formation of the
principles, but also because it was the integration of principles to technology
that made Legal-Net what it is.
Stated broadly, for Barak (and Okon), managing a judiciary was (also) a
normative exercise, and since technology was being placed at the heart of the
managerial process, it should be designed with normative values in mind.129
First among these values was transparency and accountability. As Barak saw it,
new technologies were critical to improving the judiciary’s daily bookkeeping
management, inter alia, for it would help courts generate coherent, unified, and
reliable case-load reports. Such reports were crucial to making the judiciary
more transparent and thus more accountable—both to the general public and
the community of judges and court administrators.
Given the prominence of transparency and accountability in Barak’s
thinking of judicial management, he took what may be characterized as a
show-them-the-numbers approach, believing that exposing to the general
public the judiciary’s caseload in a reliable and “neutral” manner would
contribute to the overall standing of the judiciary with the public as well as
with the other branches of government, such as the Finance Ministry. In other
words, Barak was convinced that transparency would reveal to all that courts
were overworked and doing their best under the circumstances, so that further
resources should be allocated to the judiciary. It seems that Barak was under
the assumption that, once it was understood how strained the judiciary was and
that judges were exceedingly hard-working and committed, not only could the
judiciary dispel unwarranted critique, but a convincing case for securing
additional judicial appointments and budgetary increase for the judiciary could
be made. A side-benefit might be giving the judiciary greater autonomy to run
its own affairs.
According to Okon, Barak was also invested in the judiciary’s overall
legitimacy. In our context, he realized that public confidence in the courts
relied on their ability to produce justice in a timely fashion, without
compromising due process, and therefore, to him, backlog was a serious
problem, as were pressures—such as time pressures—limiting the ability of
judges to conduct their business fairly. He held that the quality of service given
to the general public by courts must be improved, and he hoped that the
introduction of better technology to the judiciary would be a decisive step
forward in this respect (together with other efforts, such as encouraging
ADR).130
129. Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MANITOBA L.J. 383 (2004).
130. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. It should be noted, however, that such values—
accountability, transparency, fairness and rationality in managing the system —also happen to support a shift
away from access to courts as an individual right to the production of justice as providing a public service, and
then a further shift to court management as an exercise of allocating scarce public resources. This shift is in
line with instrumental business-management approaches that value cost-benefit analysis, which were in tension
with the ethos of the judiciary (as an institution committed to justice in individual cases). Under a more critical
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Barak and Okon recognized that visible disparities among courts
(including in the timeliness of their operation, resource allocation, and overall
performance and professional execution of case management) threatened the
appearance of the rule of law. They realized that the (mis)perception that
judges or court presidents sought to minimize exposure of the manner in which
they conducted their business was corrosive. A perception that judges were
hiding their inefficiencies or obfuscating discrepancies in time spent on
similarly situated cases threatened the public confidence in the courts.
At the same time, Barak and Okon also appreciated the importance of the
internal-managerial perspective on information. They believed that
transparency and the information generated by the system would enable the
judiciary’s heads to realize how efficient each judge, court, and district was.
They realized that technology-induced transparency could work inwardly. It
might motivate judges, courts, and clusters of courts (for example, several
courts within a district) to ensure that they were better than average. It would
also avoid unnecessary arguments about case allocation, and other managerial
decisions, such as where to place further resources, whether a request to teach
or to go on a sabbatical by a judge should be granted, etc.131 Barak and Okon
were also well aware, following the CMS period, that judges were sensitive to
equality of treatment; namely, they cared a great deal about their standing in
comparison to their peers. They wondered, for instance, if a judge was
summoned to discuss his or her performance, would all other similarly situated
judges be so treated?132 Transparency-through-technology could alleviate such
concerns and make courts’ management visibly fairer in the eyes of judges.
Consequently, one of Barak and Okon’s seminal ideas was to map the
“routes,” or life cycles, of typical cases, divided into the different major legal
fields and broken down into their constitutive, standard segments.133 The
resultant matrix was to be projected both internally and externally. Internally,
breaking down the legal process to routinized segments would enable the
analysis of the judicial and administrative resources that each typical set of
cases (for example, criminal, administrative, and so on) required. It was in this
context that Okon worked hard to develop “weights” that might allow the
comparison of one type of judicial proceeding to another, in terms of
administrative and judicial load. Externally, it aimed to provide the general
public with an accessible roadmap to complex judicial procedures and
litigation schemes. Here the idea was to educate the public on the workings of
the legal system in order to increase accessibility (and counter the claim that
the system was byzantine and inefficient). Okon realized that having a better,

analysis, therefore, the value-based approach also generated buy-in from the judiciary, by diffusing normative
objections, while ultimately being consonant with treating adjudication no different from any other
government-provided bureaucratic service.
131. Id.
132. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
133. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
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more rational understanding of the legal process could enable superior
management of the judiciary; it could allow for better-informed research into
the impact of possible legal reforms on the judiciary.
Another inventive scheme that was particularly dear in the Barak-Okon
mindset was that of creating a “central data clearinghouse.” Under this scheme,
all cases, wherever submitted, would arrive to one hub from which they would
be distributed to various judges according to their caseload and availability,
and where they would also be supervised and monitored. This scheme was said
to allow for a panoramic viewpoint from which “traffic jams” and other
problems would be located and centrally dealt with.
Okon sought to translate these general principles and schemes into core
operating principles, which would then underlie the design of Legal-Net. Our
findings reveal that from the very early stages of the Legal-Net design it was
explicitly intended to have considerable and effective managerial capacities, so
it would control the different phases of the judicial process while monitoring
judges’ actions and performance.134 It was also understood that such
governance was a normative exercise.
At the same time, the lessons of the grand tender were still fresh: Okon,
being a District Court judge himself (and a highly esteemed one, both in terms
of his legal knowledge and in managerial skills), knew that a policy to use
technology in order to force judges in one way or another would be highly
costly, and likely to fail.135 Nudging, by way of harnessing judicial reputation,
seemed much more effective. Moreover, Okon very much approved of the
modular approach, even if that entailed that not all features of the system
would have been operational at once, provided the modules were developed
with an overarching purpose (and normative underpinning) in mind.136
But the great attention to values would have likely not gone very far were
it not married with the relevant technology. It is safe to say, therefore, that the
most significant technological decision taken by Okon (and his IT team) was to
introduce a certain technological framework as the core of what later became
Legal-Net. That decision allowed for the development of the system to
progress and also set, to a considerable extent, its course. In everyday life,
there is a tendency to think of programming code as ‘neutral’ or ‘transparent’
134. Id.; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
135. See Coffin, supra note 73, at 399 (“It is understandable that many judges feel that the basic values
that once attracted and sustained their enthusiasm and sense of self-worth are at risk.”). Coffin suggests that
the whole world of judgment is changing, and that values from the past are in danger in the face of novel
technologies. See id. It also appears that judges feel threatened by this change and therefore do not welcome it.
This observation fits in with Okon’s approach. Okon, it seems, knew that imposing a certain modus operandi
on the judges might be thwarted by their opposition to the whole spirit of change. See Interview with Boaz
Okon, supra note 33; see also Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra
note 30.
136. Okon decided that Legal-Net would start operating even before it would be developed fully and that
it would be modified along the way, instead of being implemented as a complete and full system. In addition to
deciding to go for a flexible design process, Okon also determined that the set of rules programmed into BPM
would be altered throughout the designing process. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
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in the sense that what matters is its function, performance, perhaps graphic
design, but not necessarily the actual technical language, or software
architecture used (and definitely not the politics or values baked into the
technical architecture). Law-and-technology scholars have long noted that this
is wrong—code matters.137 The decision to turn to Business Process
Management (BPM) is perhaps the clearest case on point, surely in our
context. Adopting BPM architecture arguably transformed the way judicial
management is approached with, as we will show, some unintended
consequences.
IV. THE AGE OF BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT (BPM)
According to one definition, BPM is
A method by which a business undergoes inspection of the entire operation
of its network to evaluate processes, termed workflow, and to make specific
recommendations for improved efficiency and productivity as a way to
optimize operations. Using the information storage capacity of software to
understand how a business produces a good or service, BPM is a business
template for grasping the big picture of a network operation.”138

It follows that BPM technology, then, is an architecture (software, hardware,
network) that implements this method so as to efficiently monitor, implement,
and analyze complex production processes.
Several elements in BPM’s definition merit our attention. BPM is
commonly used in the private corporate and industrial world as a tool for
efficient management of private enterprises. It is a tool intended to inspect and
supervise, for example, the production processes of complex assembly lines.139
Further, as a management tool, BPM is meant to improve business processes
by facilitating the “translation” of overall business and production processes

137. Lessig, supra note 122, at 3–4. Lessig argues that, while some may think that “policymaking from
this perspective is simply the process of tuning legal code,” from the perspective of those attuned to the
technological dimension, “[p]olicymaking cannot function focused on legal code alone. Id. “Policymaking
instead requires a consideration of the interaction between this legal code and the architecture or technology
within which this code functions.” Id. For a more general discussion of the regulatory function of code see
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000).
138. Joseph Dewey, Business Process Management, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/document/
333271935/Business-Process-Management (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). Another possible definition is, “[BPM]
is a management discipline focused on using business process as significant contributor to achieving an
organization’s objectives through the improvement, ongoing performance management and governance of
essential business process.” John Jeston, The Perpetual Question—What Is Business Process Mangement?,
BPTRENDS,
https://www.bptrends.com/bpt/wp-content/uploads/11-05-2013%20COL-Down%20UnderWhat%20is%20BPM-John%20Jeston.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). BPM’s core idea, that production
processes may be amenable to alternations and improvements, is not new, of course. In fact, it dates back to
the early days of the 20th century. See HOWARD SMITH & PETER FINGAR, BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT:
THE THIRD WAVE (2003).
139. JOHN JESTON & JOHAN NELIS, BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT: PRACTICAL GUIDELINES TO
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION 176, 304 (2d ed. 2006). One of the most famous examples of the use made by
BPM in the industrial world was the development of the Toyota Production system (TPS). For the Toyota (as
well as the GE) examples, see HOWARD SMITH & PETER FINGAR, supra note 138, at 41–42.

April 2020]

THE USE AND MISUSE OF TECHNOLOGY

623

into a graphic display (or a numerical output) with a view to achieving better
coordination between the various segments of a manufacturing or assembling
plant (or within similar enterprises that produce goods in various locations or
stages while relying on different processes and professional languages). BPM
is therefore designed to establish better measurements for productivity and
overall efficiency across production systems and is said to be conducive to
more rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
stages of active production processes in attaining optimization.140
For its operation, BPM requires first that the production process be
meticulously fragmented to its various components, so that each component is
defined in terms of the actions entailed therein, their expected timing, and
goals. Additionally, each such component is placed in relation to other
components: the possible sequencing of the various components must be
identified. More specifically, designing and implementing a BPM engine
entails breaking down the processes to their segments, breaking down the
segments into the minute steps that much be taken within each segment, and
then plotting the steps that follow (or may follow) a previous step.
Furthermore, the direction of the workflow must be carefully detailed (for
example, can a stage or a segment be repeated? And if so, under which
circumstances?). Expected durations of each stage must also be set.
Furthermore, for each segment, failure indicators have to be established for the
system to generate relevant alerts. The resulting artifact is a detailed map of the
various paths and permutations of the different processes that lead from point
A—the beginning of the production—to point Z—its conclusion, which also
may be the starting point of another production process. For the BPM to take
advantage of its potential, it should include yet another dimension: robust data
collection and analysis of existing business processes, as actually conducted, in
order to provide measures for success (or lack thereof), potentially on all levels
(from the single worker to the entire unit).141
The decision to adopt the BPM method and architecture emerged at a
conclusion of two routes. The first was the post-tender consultation, noted
above.142 The second was a survey done by the IT team regarding the
technologies which might be suitable for building a new management system,
one module at time. As for the first, following the tender fiasco and as part of
the shift from a grand-design to the modular approach, Okon and the design

140. See Paul Harmon, Once More: Lean, the Toyota Production System, Six Sigma, and BPM, BUS.
PROCESS TRENDS, http://www.bptrends.com/publicationfiles/advisor20121023.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
BPM is also employed in the public sector in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. See Norbert Ahrend,
Opportunities and Limitations of BPM Initiatives in Public Administrations Across Levels and Institutions
(Mar. 28, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Humboldt University) (on file with the Humboldt University
Library).
141. See SMITH & FINGAR, supra note 138, at 245–50.
142. See supra Subpart III.A.
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team sought the advice of judges and administrative staff,143 inviting them not
only to articulate their needs but also to join those developing the technological
system, if only for a day or two.144 On those occasions, judges shared their
perspectives regarding the issues that concerned them the most about the
evolving system.145 They also addressed specifics, for instance, referring to
parts of the criminal process that could benefit from better technological
assistance or reflecting on how a segment of civil procedure worked, and
therefore what should be accommodated by the system. Judges’ participation
in the development process contributed significantly to the mapping of typical
judicial proceedings and their soft points, as well as their breaking down to
consecutive stages.
While this process was advancing, the IT team was seeking a solution for
an architecture that would support and structure judicial management. They
discovered the BPM engines and started to consider their advantages and
disadvantages. It was clear that any technical solution, and in particular the
BPM solution, would require a granular parsing of the legal processes in Israel,
including the scrupulous mapping of typical judicial proceedings and their
careful breaking down into distinct sequential stages. Okon led this Herculean
endeavor, which consumed hundreds of hours of his time.146 Working from an
office in the software company that worked on Legal-Net, Okon canvassed the
entire landscape of civil processes in Israel and the main criminal ones. He
thought about typical and atypical eventualities, and the subtasks within each
stage.147 Most importantly, at the end of this hard labor, forty-eight modular
Lego-like bricks, representing the different stages of various typical judicial
processes, were identified. These procedural segments, and the modular
thinking underlying the research from which they emerged, are the foundation
of Legal-Net.
In the course of the process whereby the “bricks” (or modules) were
identified, the Okon-led technical team became more familiar with a BPM
engine. The fit between BPM and the bricks-methodology was apparent, and a
decision was made to adopt the BPM architecture and a particular BPM
software, and to convert the forty-eight basic bricks into production
processes.148 Attempts were made to integrate the administrative needs of the
secretariats, as expressed during the interim phase detailed above. Okon was
also careful to consult with a select few judges in various courts to ensure that

143. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22 (crediting Okon with the initiative to engage in these
discussions).
144. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. This was, of
course, completely in accordance with the Integrative Perspective, discussed supra Subpart III.C.
145. They were chosen by Okon according to their various areas of practice. Interview with Boaz Okon,
supra note 33; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
146. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
147. See id. (detailing Okon’s detrimental contribution to the initiative); see also Interview with Shlomit
Levy, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
148. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
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he did not miss procedural junctures, although it should be stressed that the
actual process of integrating civil and criminal procedures within the BPM
technology did not involve a more general consultation with judges, as this was
deemed impractical.
The decision to place BPM at the heart of Legal-Net introduced myriad
policy questions that had to be addressed, given the nature of BPM. They had
to consider such questions as: To whom should judges report? (The practice is
that, in principle, judges may be required to report to the president of the court,
the Chief Justice, and/or the Administration.) Who could be privy to what
information regarding judges’ performance? (As further indicated below,
almost any member of the judiciary had, initially, plenary access to
information, save for issues requiring confidentiality. This was later changed at
the request of judges, allowing them to see only the status of colleagues’
cases.) What type of nudging or red flags might judges encounter regarding
their pending tasks? (The underlying principle being that judges may ignore
any flag and use their judgment to manage the case, yet flags are reported, and
their records maintained.) Sequencing rules, too, were developed with respect
to the various segments of each process and the ability to repeat a certain
segment.
As designed by Okon and his team, BPM became a comprehensive and
truly penetrating architecture. Upon launching a case within Legal-Net, the
BPM is engaged. It manages the entire process with respect to all judges at any
court (save for the Supreme Court), and with respect to all judicial decisions.
Since the basic “bricks” of the legal processes are factored in, the system
knows what the next steps should be, as it is awaiting judicial response (or,
later, response by parties to judicial interim decisions). Since judges’ schedules
are managed by Legal-Net, the system knows when the next step is due and,
thus, if no further step is scheduled, that is also noted.149 Moreover, based on
the designers’ estimates and legislative mandates, a “time duration” unit was
defined for each stage of the judicial process as a rule of thumb. As each stage
of the judicial process is monitored by the BPM, to the extent a case does not
follow the flow pre-configured in the BPM, or to the extent a deadline is
missed, or a task left unattended, various alerts are generated dependent on the
severity of the infraction. In general, the Legal-Net BPM component has three
levels of alerts designed to inform Legal-Net users of judges’ deviation from
prescribed guidelines.150 The alert system is directed both at the “deviant”
149. Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Reflecting on ODR: The Israeli Example, in 1 EXPANDING THE HORIZONS OF
ODR: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13, 15
(Pompeu Casanovas et al. eds., 2008), http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-430/Paper3.pdf (“In the design of the system, an
arduous process of mapping the various types of proceedings involved was performed in order to identify,
step-by-step, the different stages that each of these processes is comprised of.”).
150. In the initial level of alert, once a fixed time for the completion of a certain stage of trial expired,
automatic notification would appear on the judge’s Legal-Net workspace. The alert would escalate once a
month passed since the initial alert had been issued and the assignment had not yet been completed. In that
case, an alert would also appear in the workspace of the person who was administratively in charge of the
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judge (whom the system notifies of her non-compliance) as well as her seniors
(namely, the president or vice presidents of courts and the Administration). It
thus serves both as a self-monitoring tool151 and a supervising tool.152
In short, Legal-Net is able to minutely analyze judges’ performance along
the judicial processes’ flow-chart and alert any relevant stakeholder (the judge,
her supervisor, and even litigants, if this option is enabled) of any
nonconformity with its pre-ordained standards. At the same time, the system is
capable of generating an overall assessment of possible clogs in the workflow,
and it provides a tool for assessing increase or decrease in relative workload of
judges, divisions, and courts. No wonder that it was immediately recognized
by Okon and the design team that BPM could be an instrument for the
amalgamation and generation of immense information, such as judges’
workload and judicial processes’ duration, broken down into proceedings’
separate stages.
Moreover, it was soon realized that adopting BPM would enable the
judiciary’s chiefs to take the regulation of judges’ performance to a completely
new level, one that resembles the (in)famous panopticon.153 Each judge,
judicial division, court, or the entire judiciary may become unprecedentedly
specific judge’s performance, that is, usually the president of court. According to Yardeni, the Legal-Net team
made hidden this level of inner escalation in the face of judges’ opposition thereto. Yardeni’s Second
Interview, supra note 30. The third level of alerts made it possible for senior judges (and not just those who
“triggered” the alert) to view all of the assignments of their administratively-subordinate judges and
secretariats. To the best of our knowledge, the third level of alert was never used. See Yardeni’s second
interview, supra note 30; see also Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 21–22.
151. It is therefore apt to consider this feature of Legal-Net as incorporating a powerful means of reflexive
regulation in its design. For a discussion on “reflexive regulation,” see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 404–07
(2004); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1275–87 (1995); Sagy, supra
note 119, at 463–67. It is notable that before the creation of Legal-Net, under Arbel’s “Clouds” system,
deadlines could be delayed and altered by judges—the same judges subject to these deadlines—simply by
setting new “reminders.” BPM is said to have dealt with this loophole. According to Yardeni, Okon took great
pains to make it much more difficult for judges to manipulate Legal-Net. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra
note 30. Thus, for example, cases could only “move forward” in the system’s flowchart in the sense that a
judge could not manipulate the system by sending the case a step backwards in the litigation process, for
example by opening another window for testimonies once this phase of the litigation had concluded. This is a
major concern for judges who may be quite creative when applying the rules of civil procedure.
152. For instance, judges are allowed to “own” up to a certain number of proceedings that are “in limbo”
before the system begins to issue alerts, namely, cases where, although they are in the summary stage, neither
dates for future court-hearings are set, nor verdict is pending. This feature is part of an on-going attempt to
deal with case backlog in the pretrial stage. See Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.
153. The panopticon is a (penal) institution designed by Jeremy Bentham so as to allow a single watchman
to observe all inhabitants (inmates) without those subject to the observation knowing whether at any particular
point in time they are being observed; they, therefore, have to assume a constant gaze. See 4 JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (1843). This idea has been adopted as a metaphor to address a
state of constant surveillance of the many by the few (without the few knowing whether they are actively
monitored at any given time). See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, Escape Into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the
Surveillance Society, 118 YALE L.J. 131, 131–32 (2009); see also Margo Huxley, Geographies of
Governmentality, in SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: FOUCAULT AND GEOGRAPHY 185 (Jeremy W. Crampton
& Stuart Elden eds., 2007); Nigel Thrift, Overcome by Space: Reworking Foucault, in SPACE, KNOWLEDGE
AND POWER, supra, at 53.
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transparent to the heads of the judicial system (or, in fact, to any node within
the network, if such a decision is taken). This gaze allows those privy to the
data to micromanage each and every phase of the judicial process.154 But it
also means that each of the judges may be micromanaged.155 It is worth noting
that Legal-Net also tightens the grip over courts’ secretariats, as the heads of
the system – currently presidents or vice-presidents of courts – are able to
monitor their court’s secretariats assignments basket, ascertain its precise
content, and take organizational decisions accordingly.
As hinted above, Legal-Net does not suffice itself with vertical-top-down
transparency. Rather, the BPM architecture as developed and applied in LegalNet permits multi-directional transparency. Thus, Legal-Net may easily open
the door to a much more robust peer-review. With its wealth of knowledge
about each judge, and given the detailed reports Legal-Net produces for the use
of the judiciary’s doyens, the question of the immediacy and level of
information one judge may have regarding her peers hinges solely on the
access-to-information policy adopted, as the technology itself is designed to
provide full access. The level of transparency allowed by Legal-Net
corresponds with Okon’s and Barak’s target of achieving full, across-the-board
internal and external visibility on the national level.156 However, it was decided
that such a level of statistical transparency, namely the ability to generate
detailed statistical reports (and analytics), would not be available to all judges
on the individual-judge level (save their own), but only on a court-level basis
(or a division-level basis).157 Still, as mentioned, the information is available in
Legal-Net;158 it is even subject to freedom of information requests.159
Moreover, even if detailed statistics are available only to the heads of the
system, every judge is able to view her colleagues’ total number of cases,160
154. Rabinovich-Einy regards this element of a “learning system” as a positive, since it is conducive to
efficacy. However, we believe the monitoring element should also be taken into account. See RabinovichEiny, supra note 6, at 5.
155. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
156. According to Okon, Barak thought the judiciary should be transparent to all judges and even to the
general public. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; see also Yardeni’s first interview, supra note 14.
157. See Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
158. It seems that in reality, however, it is unlikely that judges (not carrying any managerial functions) are
savvy enough to know how to mine the system in search of complex information.
159. Such information requests are generally based on The Freedom of Information Law. Freedom of
Information Law, 5758-1998 (1998). A notable case in this regard is AdminA 3908/11 Courts Admin. v.
TheMarker—HaAretz Newspaper Ltd. Isr. L. Rep. 307 (2012) (Isr.). In that case, TheMarker newspaper
submitted a Freedom of Information request to the Administration of Courts to receive information indicating
the number of open cases then under consideration by the Supreme Court and the District Courts, the amount
of time that had elapsed since each case had been filed, and the names of the judges hearing the cases. Id. at
314. The State argued that revealing judges’ names would negatively impact their work and decrease public
confidence in the judiciary. Id. at 312–13. The Supreme Court held that in this case the public interest in
transparency outweighed the other concerns, reasoning that since the judiciary was one of the branches of
government having the great impact on individuals, there was a clear public interest in publicizing the
requested information. Id. at 365.
160. According to Yardeni, such viewing is documented by the system. See Yardeni’s Second Interview,
supra note 30.
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the status thereof, and therefore can assess (as a rule of thumb) the expediency
with which judges handle cases. More importantly, each judge can evaluate, in
any given time, how she or he is performing in comparison to other judges
based on the number of pending tasks or cases.
Consequently, it may very well be argued that while courts’ transparency
stands to enhance accountability, it may also serve to nudge towards
conformity, thereby raising a possible tension with judicial independence.161
To illustrate, a procrastinating judge may be subject to direct or indirect
pressures, either by someone within the system—an administrator, a senior
judge, even by a peer—or by litigants who may seek to discredit that judge
publicly. But an efficient judge, facing a complex case—or a case which she
thinks warrants careful consideration—may be similarly pressured to conform.
While some delays may be explained, a judge may be put on the defensive if it
is perceived she is taking too long to process a case compared to the pace of
others or in comparison to a “thin” understanding of productivity that crudely
measures the rate of docket clearance.162 It is not inconceivable that judges
may push parties to settle (especially in complex cases, or if the judge is
simultaneously processing many simple cases) even when she is not convinced
this is the best way to resolve the case. More generally, she may make
procedural decisions under pressure, against her best professional judgment, to
the extent her assessment of the most adequate procedural disposition of the
case conflicts with her assessment of what that disposition may look like when
evaluated only through the single lens of relative efficiency and in relation to
“the standard.” At the very least, the judge would be facing pressures to
demonstrate greater productivity, even if such productivity is skewed because
it is one-dimensional.163
At the same time, Legal-Net could be understood as enabling a
“democratizing” effect.164 As noted, Legal-Net generates multi-dimensional
organizational vectors. While it prioritizes the top-down, hierarchical vector, it
also enhances the horizontal or even bottom-up gaze, as judges are privy to
161. See Christof Demont-Heinrich, When the Panopticon Goes Online: Charting the Geography of
Power, Control and Surveillance in Cyberspace 22 (July 26, 2002), http://www.portalcomunicacion.com/
bcn2002/n_eng/programme/prog_ind/papers/0_arribats_peremail/abans_07_2002/pdf/demontheinrich.pdf
(arguing that over-transparency may undermine judges’ independence, “Individuals internalize the
panopticized norms and perform them as if someone was surveilling their performance from inside the
Panopticon.”).
162. For a critical analysis of such “thin” conception of productivity, see Hon. William G. Young &
Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity,
118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55 (developing a set of metrics that account for judicial accuracy and fairness, in
addition to speed of resolution measures).
163. For evidence of how a change in performance metrics led to measurable changes in U.S. federal court
judicial behavior, see Young & Singer, supra note 162, at 96 (“It is true that the current focus on efficiency has
skewed judicial activity in demonstrable ways, for example by vastly inflating the number of pending motions
decided in two weeks prior to semi-annual CJRA [Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990] deadlines.”).
164. See Russell Spears & Martin Lea, Panacea or Panopticon? The Hidden Power in ComputerMediated Communication, 21 COMM. RES. 427, 427 (1994) (“CMC [computer-mediated communication]
tends to equalize status, decentralize and democratize decision making.”).
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internal managerial data. In so doing, it may, in the mid-term or long-term,
undermine internal hierarchical forces. By providing judges with abundant
(comparative) information on the production process regarding judges from
higher, lower, and comparable courts, judges may challenge managerial
policies and may raise competing organizational demands.
Yet, to fully appreciate Legal-Net’s revolution, it is necessary to go
beyond issues concerning its design. The technological and social implications
of innovation become apparent only once the actual implementation on the
ground is considered. It is at this stage that technology and the various
dimensions of culture – organizational, professional, popular – interact, the
actual impact of new designs become clear, and some unintended
consequences are revealed.
V. THE JUDICIARY’S REACTION—LEGAL-NET IMPLEMENTATION AND
IMPLICATIONS
After hearing the needs of the various segments of the system, and after
the countless hours Okon (and the select few judges) spent in mapping the
various legal processes, the design team completed the staggering task of
integrating the processes into the BPM and began introducing Legal-Net to
judges at large. In May 2004, the team displayed its design to Chief Justice
Barak and, in early 2005, a series of “road shows” took place in the various
courts. The objective was to get judges’ feedback and to preempt dissent and
opposition that might be percolating among judges—a lesson learned from past
attempts and innovations.165
Early on, it became apparent that Legal-Net would require extensive
training for judges. Some judges—primarily veterans set in their ways or less
acquainted with new technologies, although clearly many veterans did not fall
into this category—would find the transition difficult.166 The hope was that
judges would welcome the new features the system promised, such as the
ability to work from home, to access legal databases, and to greatly improve
warehousing and scheduling.
But surprisingly, Legal-Net was met with initial backlash and hostility
from large swaths of the judiciary—young and old alike.167 Part of the blame

165. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; Yardeni, Second Interview, supra note 30.
166. A similar approach can be found at Coffin, supra note 73, at 399. Likewise, the challenge and the
process of individual adult learning was characterized by Smith and Fingar as a “painful experience” since it
changes long-established work patterns. SMITH & FINGAR, supra note 138, at 166.
167. In sharp contrast to the lack of cooperation by judges and secretariats in the lower courts, the
computation process of the Supreme Court process went quite smoothly. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text. It seems that the cooperation of Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, who served at that time as the Registrar of
the Supreme Court (and as a Judge at the Magistrate Court in Jerusalem) contributed to the success of the
Supreme Court’s computation effort. Her full endorsement made a difference, since as the Registrar of the
Supreme Court, Agmon-Gonen was in close contact both with the Court’s secretariat and the Chief Justice.
Presumably, her engagement was a sign of Chief Justice Aharon Barak’s support. It should be noted, however,
that the system at the Supreme Court level is not all-encompassing, as justices do not log on to the system to
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for the harsher-than-expected opposition lied, it appears, in the fact that only a
small number of judges, secretarial staff, and administration personnel took an
operational part in design of Legal-Net. Recall that even though Legal-Net
designers undertook a rigorous analysis of the key components of the legal
system to identify its constituent parts, only a select number of judges played
an active role in this process and, despite the outreach for consultation, the
users’ community at large was not privy to the technical details throughout the
design stages. That was also true in regard to the political elites of the time:
Justice Ministers and the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee
played a marginal role, if any, in the construction of Legal-Net.
Just as damaging were rumors, which began to spread as Legal-Net took
its first steps, that the system would upend the very way courts ran. The courts’
typists’ workers union went on a strike, following a scare that the advent of
Legal-Net spelled their massive dismissal.168
To make matters worse, the system went on-air when it was far from fully
functional. In fact, the launch was nearly disastrous. The president of the court
selected for the pilot had to sit at the secretariat and back the system
manually.169 Fortunately, she did not belong to the skeptics’ camp but was
rather committed to the success of the system. In addition, funds allocated to
the training of judges in the ways of Legal-Net were fast exhausted.170 LegalNet was proving to be less judge-friendly than assumed. However, going back
was not an option because the previous system could not be further maintained.
Consequently, after an eleven-week run, Legal-Net rolled in, despite not yet
being bug-free.171
One major source of the commotion accompanying Legal-Net’s
deployment was already alluded to. It was the realization that technology
brings with it a language, patterns of interaction, and goods it seeks to
promote. The introduction of the BPM architecture, accompanying jargon, and
ways of thinking all challenged established conceptions of the judicial
function. With the advent of the new techno-managerial design, gone were the
days when the ethos of the judicial role was encapsulated in the call for judges
to seek justice under the law in the particular case before them. The focal point
for the optimization of the judicial compass, in the Legal-Net era, slid from the
litigants before the courts to the litigants at large. Embedded in the novel
digitized system is the conceptualization that the judicial process is a service
provided to the public, which relies, to a large extent, on the integration of the
various components of the production line, and is therefore measured at the
system-level (provided no clear miscarriages of justice occur in particular

write their judgements, and it is not designed to offer each judge a view of all the pending cases other judges
face.
168. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22.
169. See Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
170. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22.
171. See Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.
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cases). The arrival of BPM was thus held to epitomize a transformation from a
consciousness of retail, where the judicial attention was supposed to be fully
devoted to the quality of the resolution of individual cases, to an attitude of
wholesale, where the judicial business is contextualized as a manufacturing
process that is evaluated for its overall success in applying the law to a large
number of cases as smoothly as possible. This process should therefore be
managed with the same technological tools (and the same managerial language
and measures) as other mass-production processes.172
More specifically, Legal-Net heralded a tectonic shift in the judiciary’s
work culture and work patterns.173 This shift reflected back on the individual
judge, who now found herself working in the production line. Until the
introduction of BPM, ideally, the judge thought she would be valued by the
quality of her (tailor-made) judgments. Now, Legal-Net offers templates for
decisions in run-of-the-mill cases. The BPM logic is not only about the quality
in particular cases; it is about streamlining the process (without getting too
many “rejects”). According to the new ethos, the judge is in the business of
managing and efficiently processing conflicts rather than necessarily spending
a long time pondering on the Solomonic task of making normative rulings
about what the law is and its nuanced application to the particular case before
her.174 Consequently, she is nudged to approximate the parameters of the
judicial production line, at least in terms of the procedural handling of the case,
as preordained by the Administration and configured into the Legal-Net
infrastructure. This is not to say that judges do not care about justice in
individual cases anymore, nor that in previous times managerial pressures did
not play a role in procedural decisions. But we argue that technology, and the
technological culture that surrounds it, brought with it a change in kind, and a
different structure of incentives and organizational culture.175
A tension thus had emerged between the BPM’s features and the
normative outlook underlying the Barak-Okon approach. Simply put, the BPM
technology perfectly fit several—but certainly not all— of the normative and
operational principles that had been originally envisaged. Significantly, it was
well suited to rationalizing the judicial process by effectively segmenting it.
Similarly, the BPM technology enabled and enhanced the transparency and
accountability sought by Barak and Okon. Nonetheless, BPM was clearly not
without its difficulties. As suggested, not all of the said normative and

172. This corresponds with the shifts to managerial justice, wherein judges themselves have to manage,
rather than simply resolve, disputes. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on
the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452, 455 (1992); Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982); However, the focus here is not on judges as
managers of policy-ridden disputes, but on adjudication itself as reconceived as the provision of a service, just
like any other service, and therefore subject to similar managerial considerations.
173. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 43–44.
174. See Agmon-Gonen supra note 4 (arguing that judges now may face pressures from the administration
to streamline the process, at the expense of justice in individual cases).
175. See Rabinovich-Einy supra note 6, at 5 (“A more efficient system could increase access to justice.”).
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operational principles fully materialized (at least at first). More importantly, it
soon became clear that BPM carried some unintended normative
consequences. Whereas it provided a rational basis for justifying distributive
decisions among judges (or courts) – how many cases are assigned to whom,
how many resources should be allocated to which department – it also
reconfigured the underlying premise of the project. No longer necessarily
seeking the best way to implement the individual right of litigants to access a
court of law to plead their case, the project now concerned the management of
a bureaucratic, industrialized public service where scarce public resources have
to be spread to cover the most parts efficiently.
****
Today, Legal-Net is fully deployed throughout the Israeli judiciary
(excluding the Supreme Court) and the opposition has significantly waned.176
Tendencies to complain about it—still common among judges—
notwithstanding, as these lines are written it seems no one can imagine the
Israeli judiciary operating without Legal-Net. Following the retirement of
Director Okon,177 Judge Moshe Gal took the helm, bringing with him a
resolute commitment to the incorporation of professional management
techniques. After scaling back deployment of Legal-Net in order to debug it,
he turned his attention to implementation, which included investing
considerable resources in training and support. Some software modifications
were also introduced in order to incorporate feedback from various
stakeholders, including secretariats and judges.178 At the same time, the Chief
Justice and the Director began realizing the managerial potential embedded in
Legal-Net. Reports were refined, statistics calibrated, and internal guidelines
regarding judicial management written.179 The ongoing process of
improvement and development continues, primarily regarding fine-tuning the
BPM processes in criminal law and streamlining the logs and inputs required
by the users in order to improve the usefulness of the statistics.180

176. Since the main oppositional punch against Legal-Net was thrust when the system was launched, our
interviews reveal that direct opposition dissipated as the system was rolled-in, bugs were fixed, and
modifications per the request of judges were included. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22;
Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.
177. Okon stepped down on the July 31, 2006. See Boaz Okon, ISR. JUD. AUTHORITY,
http://judgescv.court.gov.il/0F8C84BA-645E-E811-8105-0050568A6817 (Heb.) (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
178. See Interview with Moshe Gal, supra note 66; Levy’s Interview, supra note 26.
179. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22.
180. As part of implementing the system, greater flexibility was allowed for the secretariats in classifying
the various legal proceedings and legal outcomes. The rationale was that some categories are not fully clear,
and it is better to choose one classification and move on than to spend time to investigate the difference
between one category and another in classifying the motion, as that would place a burden on the administrative
staff and hinder implementation. Yet, as the reach and depth of the system expanded, it became even more
important that such classifications be accurate and precise, in order to ensure reliability of the data. Today it is
still advisable to corroborate the older data stored in the system with other sources. See Keren WeinshallMargel et al., [ יצירת מדד משקלות תיקים להערכת העומס השיפוטי בישראלCase-Weights for The Assessment of
Judicial Workloads in Israel], 44 MISHPATIM 769 (2015) (Heb.). In constructing this index, the authors came
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Beyond fine-tuning the existing modules, the IT team is now working in
coordination with the Judicial Research Unit (an arm of the Administration of
Courts) and the Chief Justice on the next phase: developing more sophisticated
measures with which to assess caseload. These tools, once fully developed,
would serve as a calibrated weight for the judicial workload. The idea
originally was to assess how “expensive” each judicial proceeding is in terms
of system resources (primarily judicial time) so that budgetary discussions
would be data-driven, allocation decisions rationalized, and debates about
procedural reforms informed. It has evolved, however, to also address the
expectations from individual judges. Once the weights per set of motions are
calibrated, judges in different instances will be informed what is expected of
them in a given time segment, as part of the overall production line.181
Yet, all along, judges keep looking for creative ways to resist the full
digitization of the judicial process.182 Our interviews indicate that to this day
many judges prefer to print some, if not most, trial materials. Furthermore, as a
matter of course, lawyers continue to submit physical forms in addition to the
digital submissions, if only to be on the safe side. The number of printers and
toners has increased in recent years, while the demand for judicial storage
space mushrooms.183 In the course of our interviews, we were told that less
than a sixth of all judges (out of a total of about 800) work solely with LegalNet electronic files. The rest use Legal-Net partially, and still carry out some
functions manually in tandem with Legal-Net.184 As indicated above, the
sources of this resistance may be found in judges’ aversion to novelties.185
Perhaps the attempt to fully digitize the legal process meets resistance also
because the technology— primarily the hardware—is not yet fully mature;
reading materials on a computer screen or an ordinary tablet may seem less
convenient compared to reading printed materials. We cannot, however, rule
out that the reason behind the resistance at least in part relates to the
discomfort with the transformation of the judicial role embedded in the new
technology.
CONCLUSION: LEGAL-NET’S REVOLUTION
The development of Legal-Net, the online digital system for case
management, is a window to the relationship between regulation, technology,
to the conclusion that they could not rely solely on the data on Legal-Net, and thus corroborated the data via
other methodologies.
181. Interview with Keren Weinshall-Margel, supra note 22.
182. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161,
169–73 (2000) (showing similar patterns of resistance in the United States).
183. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22.
184. Nicknamed the “Ezroni file,” namely a hard copy that is printed in order to assist (in Hebrew, “ezer”)
the judge so that she does not have to scroll endlessly, restricted to limited screen size.
185. As was argued by Coffin, supra note 73, at 402 (“[T]here is a need for human judgment in
determining when technology serves the judicial process and when it begins to dominate.”).
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and the judicial function. This Article unearthed the development process that
led to the adoption of the system and revealed the four approaches to
technology as a regulative tool: (1) the functional approach (technology is but
a necessary tool to address pressures on critical infrastructure emanating from
mass demand); (2) the command-and-control approach (technology controls
the architecture of bureaucracy, and should be used to channel the exercise of
state power by creating rigid rules of sequential do’s and don’ts); (3) the
collaborative, integrative approach (technology is a platform for joint decision
making, and its development is an opportunity to develop an ethos of
integration and shared organizational identity around a joint mission); and (4)
the normative, “nudging” approach (technology is a tool for implementing
values and normative choices, and its design should reflect these choices and
encourage those subject to the technology to adhere to these values).
More broadly, the history of the development of Legal-Net is an
important chapter in the accelerated evolution of technology at the turn of the
millennia, as different players—private and public—sought to redesign
processes of communication, information-gathering, knowledge-production,
and organizational management, and in so doing transformed social practices,
societal roles, and, to an extent, conceptions of subjects (“data-subjects”) and
values.186
This Article thus corresponds with literature on theories of regulation by
documenting a shift from command-and-control strategies to regulationthrough-information approaches, influenced by managerial considerations and
thus sensitive to actual performances.187 This is a unique setting to examine
these questions, as the regulated “industry” is the judiciary—an institution that
is necessarily associated with being subject to such regulation. Furthermore,
the unique type of regulation chosen, regulation through information, is
particularly interesting. Intertwined are elements of self-regulation (judges are
encouraged to behave according to certain expectations, generated by their
peers, the professional community, and their superiors), as communicated by
way of relative ordering of judges’ productivity. It is also interesting as it
provides information with respect to one measure (such as efficiency) but not
necessarily with respect to other measures (such as quality, or justice at the
retail level).

186. For accounts of the contributions of other key players, see, for example, STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX:
HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS AND SHAPES OUR LIVES (2011) (showing how Google employees brought
certain values to their workforce, but were also shaped by the logic of the technology Google developed); see
also BRIAN MERCHANT, THE ONE DEVICE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE IPHONE (2017) (providing an account
of how implementation of existing technologies, coupled with innovative developments, usher in a new
product that transformed social practices).
187. Stephen D. Sugarman, Performance-Based Regulation: Enterprise Responsibility for Reducing
Death, Injury, and Disease Caused by Consumer Products, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1035 (2009);
Stephen D. Sugarman, Viewing Equal Educational Opportunity Through the Lens of Regulation Theory
(unpublished paper presented at the 4th Annual Robert A. Kagan Lecture in Law and Regulation at Berkeley
Law, Mar. 14, 2018) (on file with authors).
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As this Article demonstrates, the particular application of certain
technological architecture brought with it a reconfiguration of the judicial role.
The use of the BPM structure nudged judges, likely inadvertently, to think of
their role as part of the assembly line, the business of which is to produce
dispute settlements under the law.188 This may be regarded as a positive
development, depending on one’s normative approach toward the judicial
function. But our findings suggest it was not intended. In that sense, the case
study is relevant for thinking about “regulation by design.”189 The adoption of
Legal-Net is an example of such an approach—it was developed with
“regulation by design,” as the fourth phase of the development reveals. Yet the
lessons Legal-Net carries are two-fold: first, the development is itself a process
and therefore subject to uncertainty, thus escaping a predetermined
comprehensive design. Legal-Net is not a product of a grand design but rather
a product of different decisions taken at different times informed by economic
and technological realities, and perception of need and political buy-in.
Second, and related, the design finally chosen entailed some unintended
normative outcomes (as well as a certain degree of friction, or resistance).190
These lessons may thus be relevant to other calls for regulation by design (such
as calls for better protecting privacy or other values).
Lastly, this case study is important not only because it allows us to better
understand the different approaches to the regulative function of technology,
and not only because these regulative approaches were applied to the
production of justice (and therein directly touched upon the judicial function).
It is important because it forces us to consider the relationship (and tension)
between transparency and professional autonomy. Conceptually, it is unclear
whether this tension can be captured by privacy because it is not clear whether
there is expectation of privacy by judges with respect to the exercise of the
judicial function. However, substantively, the technological gaze, which entails
the ability of managers, peers, the legal community, and the public to track the
machination of the “legal assembly line” at a high level of resolution by
surveilling judges in their courtrooms and chambers, raises concerns regarding
the pressures to conform to aggregative (wholesale) practices which may be in
tension with due process at the retail level. It would appear that judges require
some social space that preserves a buffer from constant monitoring for their

188. For a discussion of how artificial intelligence technologies may change how all lawyers view their
roles, see McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 23, at 3064–65 (describing that artificial intelligence may threaten
lawyers “monopoly” on legal knowledge).
189. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 697, 701 (2018) (holding that “technologists, system designers, advocates, and regulators increasingly
seek to use the design of technological systems for the advancement of public policy—to govern ‘by
design.’”).
190. For another example of unintended consequences of the integration of technology into the courtroom,
see Fronk, supra note 5, at 54. Fronk found that computerized legal research capabilities encouraged more indepth legal analysis and led to a reduction in conclusory string citations of multiple cases. Id. at 54, 76–77.
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deliberation to retain the human dimension of judging.191 This is especially
pertinent in light of the ability of the system to generate statistical reports and
mine data for more complex forms of analysis in the future.
More abstractly, the emergence of Legal-Net demonstrates the dilemma
faced by the developers acting on behalf of the state—wanting to address the
need to ensure compliance with productivity while protecting judicial
independence. Legal-Net harnesses the “nudge” generated by the incentive to
maintain, or augment, judicial reputation (as a form of professional capital).192
In so doing, Legal-Net also serves as a managerial tool for “rational”
distribution of resources, including caseload among judges. This is significant,
as managers need to maneuver between the various stakeholders as they seek
to streamline the process in an equitable manner. These stakeholders include
the individual judges, presidents of courts, and litigating lawyers, but also, for
example, the Finance Ministry (which wants to ensure data-driven allocation).
The price, however, is also evident: the new technological environment has
arguably reconfigured the judicial role towards a more functional
understanding of service provision. The “nudging” is a form of social control
that is foreign to the notion of justice in an individual case. Moreover, the new
ecosystem raises concerns regarding the ability to generate judicial profiles
that include propensities to handle a case one way or another, including the
probability to be receptive to certain procedural moves. This may bring about
deeper concerns for manipulation.

191. For the dangers associated with computerized courts, see John Morison & Adam Harkens, Reengineering Justice? Robot Judges, Computerized Courts and (Semi) Automated Legal Decision-Making, 39
LEGAL STUD. 618 (2019).
192. Cf. NUNO GAROUPA & TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (2015)
(addressing the various audiences that generate potential reputation). We build upon this understanding of
reputation by adding the notion of the “internal gaze”—the gaze of judges as peers within a given system.
Fronk argues that as it relates to reputation amongst their peers, the declining cost of judicial citation made
judges look for other mechanisms to “differentiate” themselves, including more in-depth analysis. Fronk,
supra note 5, at 89. We argue that judges’ standing in the community in terms of productivity also matters.

